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BANKRUPTCY’S PROTECTION FOR
NON-DEBTORS FROM
SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION
John M. Wunderlich *
ABSTRACT
Given the recent economic climate, the judiciary faces an all too
familiar challenge: navigate through the web that is bankruptcy and
securities fraud. So far, bankruptcy has evolved into a tool to resolve
mass tort litigation, like securities fraud. However, this Article
explores bankruptcy as a tool to resolve securities litigation against
non-debtors, those that never file for bankruptcy protection. The
protection the Bankruptcy Code provides to non-debtors, like
officers and directors, goes largely unnoticed, much to the detriment
of securities fraud victims. Mindful that we now are in the midst of
another financial crisis and that attention will slowly turn to the
courts to pick up the pieces, this Article explores the significant
protection non-debtors obtain from their debtor-company’s
bankruptcy filing and the adverse consequences it has for securities
fraud litigants seeking recovery from these non-debtors.

I. INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy has evolved into a tool to resolve mass tort litigation,
like securities fraud. However, this Article explores bankruptcy’s effect
on securities litigation against non-debtors, those that never file for
*
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bankruptcy protection. The protection the Bankruptcy Code (“the
Code”) provides non-debtors, like officers and directors, goes largely
unnoticed, much to the detriment of securities fraud victims. Mindful
that the recent economic climate will force the judiciary to navigate the
web that is bankruptcy and securities fraud, 1 this Article explores the
significant protection non-debtors obtain from their debtor-company’s
bankruptcy filing and the adverse consequences it has for securities
fraud litigants seeking recovery from these non-debtors.
This Article first discusses the general concept of investor recovery
under the securities laws and the Code. 2 Next, it explores bankruptcy’s
implications for securities fraud suits against non-debtors. 3 The Article
discusses how the automatic stay is used to protect directors and officers
from securities litigation and affect a de facto release from liability. 4 It
shows that a company’s bankruptcy can impose duplicative discovery
costs on plaintiff-investors and even influence the certification of a class
action outside of bankruptcy against non-debtors. 5 Furthermore, the
Article demonstrates that in a company’s bankruptcy, the bankruptcy
court can release non-debtors from liability outright. 6 It then argues that
the Code’s proposed remedy for investor-fraud, the bankruptcy trustee,
is inadequate. 7 The trustee likely lacks standing to sue on behalf of
plaintiff-investors, and may be barred from recovering applicable
insurance proceeds. The Article concludes that bankruptcy’s unnoticed
protection for non-debtors from securities fraud impedes investor
recovery for fraud.

II. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND THE SECURITIES LAWS
Both bankruptcy and private securities fraud class actions are
collective devices that pool the congruent interests of multiple claimants
1. Richard D. Cudahy, What Use is the Judiciary in a Financial Crisis? 41 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. iii, x (2010).
2. See infra Part II (discussing investor-recovery under the Code, private rights of
action for securities fraud, and bankruptcy’s protection for corporate defendants from
securities litigation).
3. See infra Part III.A.-D.
4. See infra Part III.B. (showing that directors and officers often seek to extend the
automatic stay under the Code with arguments resting on faulty premises).
5. See infra Part III.C.
6. See infra Part III.D.
7. See infra Part IV.A-B.
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to a single fund. 8 Apart from this common design, bankruptcy petitions
and securities fraud allegations often go hand-in-hand as economic
downturn causes corporations to miss earnings expectations or default
on debt, fueling both securities litigation and bankruptcy. 9 Filing rates
for business bankruptcies and securities lawsuits between 2007 and 2009
evidence this correlation. Business bankruptcies increased dramatically
as a result of the financial market turmoil caused by the subprime
mortgage crisis in 2008 and 2009.10 According to the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, at the end of September 2009,
business bankruptcies increased by fifty-two percent from a year
earlier.11 Securities litigation likewise spiked.12 Interestingly, many of
8. See In re Computer Learning Ctrs. Inc., 344 B.R. 79, 92 n.19 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
2006) (observing that the advantage of proceeding by a class action—aggregating
claims and determining liability for an entire class in a single trial—can be achieved in
bankruptcy as well).
9. Kevin LaCroix, Corporate Defaults, Bankruptcies, and D&O Claims, IV
INSIGHTS, 4 (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.oakbridgeins.com/newsletter.htm;
Cudahy, supra note 1, at x (“[B]ankruptcy is frequently followed by corporate fraud
charges and it is an old story how this can be triggered by public indignation driven by
widespread financial losses.”). History bares out this correlation as well, as agitation for
bankruptcy legislation arose during the depression in 1793, the financial crisis and
controversy over the Bank of the United States in the 1820s, the Panic of 1837, and the
Panic of 1857. DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION, A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW IN AMERICA, 25 (2001). Professor Roberta Romano similarly observes that “the
Enron scandal was followed by revelations of accounting fraud and insider self-dealing
at several large corporations, nearly all of which were thereafter pushed into
bankruptcy: Adelphia Communications, Global Crossing, Tyco International, and
WorldCom.” Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L. J. 1521, 1545 (2005).
10. John Hartgen, Total Bankruptcy Filings Up 34 Percent, Business Filings Up 61
Percent in Third Quarter, American Bankruptcy Institute, (Dec. 15, 2008),
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/Conte
ntDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=55930 (last visited on Feb. 5, 2009)
11. Press Release, Admin. Office of the Courts, Bankruptcy Filings Up 34 Percent
over Last Fiscal Year (Nov. 25, 2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/
2009/BankruptcyFilingsSep2009.cfm. Similarly, between 2007 and 2008, the number
of bankruptcy filings increased by twenty-eight percent. Press Release, U. S. Bankr.
Courts, Bankruptcy Cases Commenced and Terminated During the Twelve Month
Periods ended June 30, 2007 and 2008, http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/
2008/bankrupt_newstat_ftable_jun2008.xlswww.uscourts.gov/bnkrptcystats/bankruptcy
stats.htm. As of February 2009, bankruptcy filings were up thirty-seven percent from a
year earlier. Bill Rochelle & Bob Willis, U.S. Bankruptcy Filings Surged 37% in
February Over Prior Year (Mar. 19, 2009), http://www.bankruptcy-statistics.com. “All
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the companies that file bankruptcy are named in securities fraud suits
(seventy-seven percent of the large public companies that filed for
bankruptcy between 2007 and 2008).13 This Part explores the Code’s
effect on investor recovery, private rights of action for securities fraud,
and how a company is protected in bankruptcy from securities litigation.
A. INVESTOR RECOVERY UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
The Code governs how persons and companies go out of business
or recover from debt. The Code gives the honest, but unfortunate,
The bankruptcy discharge
debtor a “financial fresh start.”14
accomplishes this goal by releasing debtors from personal liability from
specific debts and prohibiting creditors from taking action against the
debtor to collect those debts.15 Upon discharge, the debtor is no longer
liable for any debt incurred before the bankruptcy petition.16 The nature
and scope of a debtor’s discharge depends on the chapter of the Code
under which the debtor files. The Code affords two types of relief:
liquidation under Chapter 7 and reorganization under either Chapter 11
or 13.
1. Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Liquidation
Chapter 7 is used to liquidate the debtor’s assets and distribute the
property to the debtor’s creditors.17 In Chapter 7, a bankruptcy court
but twelve states had double-digit increases in filings in February from the prior
month.” Id.
12. Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Filings: 2009: A Year in Review,
at 3 (2009), available at, http://www.cornerstone.com/files/News/02dc60a4-d89f
-4e99-82cf-cb19742db676/Presentation/NewsAttachment/364f486f-9f92-4354-8002-d2
c9912cdab8/Cornerstone_Research_Filings_2009_YIR.pdf (finding 177 filings in 2007,
and 223 filings in 2008); Stephanie Plancich & Svetlana Starykh, Recent Trends in
Securities Class Action Litigation: 2009 Year-End Update, at 2 (2009), available at,
http://www.nera.com/publication.asp?p_ID=4015 (finding 195 filings in 2007, and 253
in 2008).
13. LaCroix, supra note 9, at 3 (citing the Advisen Report analyzing securities fraud
lawsuits and bankruptcies). Both the largest bankruptcies and biggest corporate
scandals in the past ten years occurred simultaneously, including WorldCom, Enron,
and Adelphia Communications. Bankruptcydata.com.
14. E.g., Local Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
15. E.g., Cent. Virginia Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363-64 (2006).
16. 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(c)(1), 1141, 1328.
17. E.g., Boston & Maine Corp. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 587 F.3d 89, 99-100
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grants a discharge after the termination of the period for filing objections
to the discharge by the trustee and the debtor’s creditors.18 Typically,
Chapter 7 cases are “no asset” cases and are used by persons.19 In
Chapter 7, debts as a result of securities fraud, i.e., judgments or
settlements, cannot be discharged.20
A company may also file under Chapter 7, although this is rare;
when it does so, it stops all operations, liquidates any assets, and goes
out of business.2 1 The recovery of such a company’s investors depends
on the ordering system (or “rules of priority”) in the Code.22 Investors
who take the least risk—by extending credit backed by collateral, such
as a mortgage—are paid first.23 Bondholders likely recover more than
shareholders; bonds represent the debt of the company, and the company
has agreed to pay bondholders interest and return their principal.24
Shareholders take the greatest risk owning the company’s profits and
losses,25 so they are last in line for repayment if the company fails.26
2. Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 Reorganization
Chapters 11 and 13 “reorganize” the debtor and provide for a
payment plan for creditors. Chapter 13, the reorganization process used
by persons, grants a discharge to a debtor upon the completion of the

(1st Cir. 2009); In re M & S Grading, Inc., 526 F.3d 363, 367 (8th Cir. 2008).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 727(c)(1); FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004.
19. Ed Flynn, et al., Chapter 7 Asset Cases, 21 AM. BANKR. INST. L.J. 22 (2003)
(“During the year ended June 30, 2002, there were 1,026,901 chapter 7 cases closed
nationwide. About 96 percent of chapter 7 cases are closed without any funds collected
and distributed to creditors by the assigned trustee.”).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19).
21. See, e.g., Carpenters Health & Welfare Trust Funds for Cal. v. Roberston (In re
Rufener Constr., Inc.), 53 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1995).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 727.
23. Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Bankruptcy Basics: What Happens When Public
Companies Go Bankrupt? What Every Investor Should Know 69 (2004).
24. U.S Securities and Exchange Commission, What Every Investor Should Know .
. . Corporate Bankruptcy, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/bankrupt.htm (last visited
Oct. 3, 2009) [hereinafter What Every Investor Should Know].
25. “Securities are specialized contracts. Investors agree to contribute capital and
bear the risk of the enterprise; in exchange they get promises of a role in running the
business and a share of the returns.” Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 614 (1985).
26. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (subordinating investors to all other claimants).
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debtor’s plan of reorganization.27 Conversely, a debtor who files under
Chapter 11 receives a discharge when the plan is merely confirmed,
rather than completed.28 A corporation often uses Chapter 11 to
“reorganize” its business to try to become profitable again and continue
for the sake of its employees and other interested parties.29 In a Chapter
11 bankruptcy, management continues to run the daily operations, while
the bankruptcy court must approve all significant decisions.30 The
debtor files a plan of reorganization (an exclusive right for the first 120
days31) that provides for the discharge of nonexempt, pre-petition debt.32
Chapter 11 reorganization departs from the traditional liquidating
function of bankruptcy.33 In general, under the plan, old shares and
interests may be exchanged for new shares and interests in the
reorganized company, which may be fewer in number and worth less.34
Also under the plan, bondholders may stop receiving interest and
principal payments, and shareholders may stop receiving dividends.35
Bondholders may receive new stock in exchange for their bonds, new

27. 11 U.S.C. § 1328.
28. 11 U.S.C. § 1141.
29. E.g., Boston & Maine Corp. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 587 F.3d 89, 99-100
(1st Cir. 2009); NMSBPCSLDHB, L.P. v. Integrated Telecom Express, Inc. (In re
Integrated Telecom Express, Inc.), 384 F.3d 108, 119 (3d Cir. 2004); Cedar Shore
Resort, Inc. v. Mueller (In re Cedar Shore Resort, Inc.), 235 F.3d 375, 379 (8th Cir.
2000); Canadian Pac. Forest Prods., Ltd. v. J.D. Irving, Ltd. (In re Gibson Group, Inc.),
66 F.3d 1436, 1442 (6th Cir. 1995). This was the case with many airlines throughout
the 1980s and 1990s. See Robert M. Hardaway, Of Cabbages and Cabotage: The Case
for Opening Up the U.S. Airline Industry to International Competition, 34 TRANSP. L.J.
1, 25 (2007); Mark Mathiesen, Comment, Bankruptcy of Airlines: Causes, Complaints,
and Changes, 61 J. AIR L. & COM. 1017, 1024-25 (1996).
30. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107(a), 1108; see also 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)-(c).
31. Id. at § 1121.
32. See id. at § 1141(d); see also United States v. White, 466 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th
Cir. 2006); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n. v. NRG Energy, Inc., 457 F.3d
776, 779-80 (8th Cir. 2006); Sequa Corp. v. Christopher (In re Christopher), 28 F.3d
512, 515 (5th Cir. 1994). “[E]xempt property is property that a debtor does not have to
turn over to his creditors if he files for bankruptcy. Permitting a debtor a few of his
things, the reasoning goes, will help him make a ‘fresh start’ once his debts have been
discharged in bankruptcy.” SKEEL, JR., supra note 9, at 41.
33. Richard E. Mendales, Intensive Care for the Public Corporation: Securities
Law, Corporate Governance, and the Reorganization Process, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 979,
982 (2008).
34. What Every Investor Should Know, supra note 24.
35. Id.
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bonds, or some combination, and shareholders may receive nothing.36
B. PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS
While the Code deals with liquidating and reorganizing a business,
the securities laws deal with issuing securities when starting a company
(such as initial public offerings or “IPOs”) and the secondary trading of
securities in the market. To ensure the integrity of the American
marketplace, the securities laws afford private rights of action to victims
of securities fraud.37 The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the
need for private enforcement as a supplement to enforcement by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the Department of
Justice (“DOJ”).38 Several significant securities laws have shaped
private securities fraud litigation.
1. The New Deal and the 1933 and 1934 Acts
As part of the “New Deal” in response to the Great Depression,
President Roosevelt promulgated two statutes that changed the
landscape of securities offerings and trading: the Securities Act of
193339 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.40 The Securities Act
36. Id.
37. E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 2 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (finding that securities
regulation protects investors and promotes growth of financial markets); see also H.R.
REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731
(stating that the purpose of securities laws is to protect investors and maintain
confidence in the market so national savings and investments may grow for the benefit
of all).
38. E.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007);
Dura Pharm. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224, 231 (1988); Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986); J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). Indeed, “[f]ederal prosecutions for serious financial
crime plummeted as the nation headed toward one of the worst economic meltdowns in
U.S. history,” and from 2003 to 2009, the number of federal corporate fraud cases
dropped by 55%, securities fraud charges dropped 17% and bankruptcy fraud cases fell
by 44%. Brad Heath, Fraud Prosecutions Fell As Crisis Loomed, USA TODAY (Dec.
16,
2009),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-12-15-prosecutefraud_N.htm.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) et. seq.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78 et. seq. The Great Depression not only spurred securities
reform, but Bankruptcy reform as well. The large number of corporate insolvencies
created pressure to modify the reorganization process. See Mendales, supra note 33, at
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of 1933 (the “1933 Act”) sought to provide investors with sufficient,
material information regarding securities that were offered for sale, and
to prohibit deceit by the offerees.41 The 1933 Act, which regulates the
primary offering of securities, contains two anti-fraud measures
enforceable by private rights of action that threaten issuers and related
parties into accurate disclosure.42
First, Section 11 allows those that buy securities in an IPO to sue
IPO “participants” who have made a material misrepresentation (either a
misstatement or omission) in the stock’s registration statement.4 3 A
“participant” includes the issuer of the securities, its officers and
directors, the signers of the registration statement, underwriters, and
other professionals such as accountants, engineers, appraisers, and
attorneys.44 Under Section 11, plaintiffs may establish liability by
showing that the registration statement contained a material
misrepresentation or omission.45 However, defendants (except for the
issuer) are protected from this draconian form of liability if they proved
that they exercised due diligence in the offering.46

987.
41. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
42. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288-89 (2d Cir. 1969). A
fundamental purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 “was to substitute a philosophy of
full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard
of business ethics in the securities industry.” SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 77k.
44. Michael J. Kaufman, Section 11 of Securities Act of 1933—Material
Misstatement or Omission in Registration Statements, in § 1:7 EXPERT WITNESSES:
SECURITIES CASES (2010); In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1421 (9th
Cir. 1994) (auditor liability); Monroe v. Hughes, 31 F.3d 772, 774 (9th Cir. 1994)
(accountant liability); In re Am. Cont’l Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F.
Supp. 1424, 1458 (D. Ariz. 1992) (attorney liability).
45. E.g., In re Constar Int’l Inc. Sec. Litig., 585 F.3d 774, 782-83 (3d Cir. 2009);
APA Excelsior III L.P. v. Premiere Techs., Inc., 476 F.3d 1261, 1271 (11th Cir. 2007);
In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1027 (9th Cir. 2005). Scienter is not required for
a Section 11 claim. In re Charles Schwab Corp. Sec. Litig., 257 F.R.D. 534, 544 (N.D.
Cal. 2009).
46. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)-(b). “Due diligence” requires the defendants to conduct
a reasonable investigation which leaves them with no grounds to believe that the parts
of the registration statement attributed to them contained material misstatements or
omissions. 15 U.S.C. 77k(b)(3); see also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375, 381-82 (1983); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697-703
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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Second, Section 12 allows the purchasers of securities to sue
anyone who offers or sells the securities through a prospectus or oral
communication that contains a material misstatement or omission.47 A
plaintiff need only prove that the offeror or seller made a material
misstatement or omission.48 The difference between Section 11 and
Section 12 is that the former pertains to misrepresentations made in a
registration statement, while the latter pertains to misrepresentations
made in a prospectus.49
Also as part of the “New Deal,” Congress passed the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”) to regulate the secondary
trading of securities.5 0 The 1934 Act sought to protect investors against
the manipulation of stock prices by giving investors the right to sue for
securities fraud.51 The majority of securities fraud claims are brought
under § 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5,52 which allows plaintiffs to recover
damages caused by an act or omission resulting in fraud or deceit in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.53 A plaintiff must
allege and prove: (1) that the defendant made a material
misrepresentation or omission (materiality); (2) that the defendant acted
with a wrongful state of mind (scienter); (3) that the material
misrepresentation or omission was made in connection with the
47. 15 U.S.C. § 71(a)(2). A prospectus is a printed document that describes a
corporation’s business and is distributed to prospective buyers or investors. B LACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1259 (8th ed. 2004).
48. An offeror or seller is someone who successfully solicits the purchase of
securities motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his own financial interests or
those of the securities owner. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1988).
49. See, e.g., Miller v. Thane Int’l, Inc., 519 F.3d 879, 885 (9th Cir. 2008); Benzon
v. Morgan Stanley Distrib., Inc., 420 F.3d 598, 608 (6th Cir. 2005); In re Adams Golf,
Inc. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 267, 277 (3d Cir. 2004); Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis,
297 F.3d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir. 2002); Gasner v. Bd. of Superintendents of the County
of Dinwiddie, Va., 103 F.3d 351, 356 (4th Cir. 1996).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78(a).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195
(1976); Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Origin of 10b-5 and its Place Among
the Fraud Provisions, in 1 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD § 2:11 (2d
ed. 2009).
52. Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, SEC Rule 10b-5 and its New Statute
of Limitations: The Circuits Defy the Supreme Court, 51 BUS. LAW. 309, 310 (1996).
53. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Although neither § 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 explicitly
provides for a private cause of action, the availability of a 10b-5 action is now beyond
doubt because of legislative acquiescence, judicial consensus, and the test of time. See
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983).
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purchase or sale of a security (in connection with); (4) that the plaintiff
relied on the material misrepresentation (reliance); (5) that the plaintiff
suffered an economic loss as a result (damages); and (6) that the material
misrepresentation actually caused the loss (loss causation).54
2. The Contract with America and the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
After the enactment of these laws, “America’s financial markets
became the envy of the world” and foreign capital flowed into the
United States from investors assured that American markets were not
being manipulated.55 These investors received assurance because
defrauded investors could bring private actions to recover damages upon
a violation of the securities laws.56
Yet in the 1990s, Congress perceived a threat to the stability of
American financial markets from frivolous investor suits.5 7 In response,
Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(“PSLRA”) to encourage plaintiffs’ lawyers to pursue only merited
claims.58 To do this, Congress imposed a heightened pleading
requirement that: mandated that plaintiffs plead facts with particularity
and a strong inference of scienter;59 revised the ways lead plaintiffs and
counsel were selected in securities class actions;60 enhanced Rule 11’s
application in the securities context;61 and stayed discovery pending a
motion to dismiss.62 However, the PSLRA simply shifted securities
litigation to state courts.63 Thus, in 1998, as a supplement to the
PSLRA, Congress enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act (“SLUSA”) that made federal courts the exclusive venue for class
54. Dura Pharm. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005).
55. Michael J. Kaufman, The PSLRA, Enron and Laxity, in SECURITIES LITIGATION:
DAMAGES § 4:4 (2010) (Judge Abner J. Mikva discussing the history of the securities
laws).
56. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 8 (1995) reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 687.
57. Id. at 4-5.
58. Id. at 4, 6.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S.
308, 313 (2007).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(1)-(2).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (stay of discovery provision).
63. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ET. AL, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS,1047 (10th ed. 2007).
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actions alleging fraud in the sale of certain securities.64
3. Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley
However, “[i]n 2001, a corporate scandal of unprecedented
magnitude struck the American economy. It began with the collapse of
Enron in late 2001. Within eight months, three other corrupt corporate
giants had followed Enron into bankruptcy: Worldcom, Global Crossing,
and Adelphia. Each had the same problem: fraudulent managers who
had cooked the books and looted the companies.”65 In response, in
2003, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”), which had
several effects on corporate governance. It required principal executive
officers to certify that each annual and quarterly report filed with the
SEC contained no false or misleading information and that the financial
statements fairly represented the financial condition of the company.66
SOX also provided criminal penalties if the CEO or CFO knowingly
certified false information.67 Additionally, SOX required that each
annual report filed by the company discuss the internal controls
established to guard against fraud and assess their effectiveness.68
SOX was the only legislation to recognize the link between
bankruptcy and securities fraud actions. Before SOX, the bankruptcy
laws permitted wrongdoers to discharge judgments or settlements for
securities fraud in bankruptcy.6 9 Congress sought “to help defrauded
investors recoup their losses and to hold accountable those who violate
securities laws”70 by amending the Code to render nondischargeable
debts arising from the violation of laws and regulations dealing with
securities.71 However, Congress has never elaborated on bankruptcy’s
64. The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1,
78u; see Cal. Pub. Emps’ Ret. Sys. v. Worldcom, Inc., 368 F.3d 86, 98 (2d Cir. 2004).
According to a joint House-Senate Committee Report, the decline in federal securities
class action suits that occurred after the passage of PSLRA was accompanied by a
nearly identical increase in state court filings. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 14-15
(1998) (Conf. Rep.).
65. LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 145 (2005).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1350(c).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a)-(b).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 7202.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 7202.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2).
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effects on securities fraud litigation. Nor has Congress ever addressed
bankruptcy’s implications for securities fraud litigation actions against
non-debtors.
C. BANKRUPTCY’S PROTECTION FOR THE DEBTOR-COMPANY
Apart from the practical reason securities fraud plaintiffs do not
pursue insolvent companies (the company is broke), the Code also
serves to deter recovery for securities fraud. Without providing an
extensive overview of a securities fraud claimant’s path through the
debtor-company’s bankruptcy, this Part highlights three key points that
deter vigorous pursuit of securities fraud claims against a debtor: (1) the
automatic stay; (2) the partial disapproval of the class action in
bankruptcy; and (3) the absolute priority rule that subordinates
shareholders’ claims.
First, the automatic stay under Section 362 of the Code stops
securities fraud litigation.72 The automatic stay is a fundamental aspect
of the Code because it provides the debtor a “breathing spell” from
creditors and collection actions.73 Although securities fraud plaintiffs
72. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). See, e.g., Caprin v. Simon Transp. Servs., Inc., 99 F.
App’x 150, 153 n.1 (10th Cir. 2004) (non-precedential disposition); In re Spring Corp.
Sec. Litig., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1199-12000 (D. Kan. 2002); In re ComDisco Sec.
Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1261, n.1 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Brick v. Dominion Mortg. &
Realty Trust, 442 F. Supp. 283, 309-10 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
73. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 52 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5840.
Depending on the federal circuit, actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are
void or voidable. Compare Mann v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co., 316 F.3d 1, *3 (1st
Cir. 2003) (stating that actions taken in violation of the stay are void) and E.
Refractories, Co., Inc. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 157 F.3d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1998)
(same), and In re Myers, 491 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 2007) (same), and Chao v. Hosp.
Staffing Servs., Inc. 270 F.3d 374, 384 (6th Cir. 2001) (same), and Middle Tenn. News
Co., Inc. v. Charnel of Cinn., Inc., 250 F.3d 1077, 1082 (7th Cir. 2001) (same), and
Griffin v. Wardrobe (In re Wardrobe), 559 F.3d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 2009) (same), and
Franklin Sav. Ass’n v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 31 F.3d 1020, 1022 (10th Cir.
1994) (same), and United States v. White, 466 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th Cir. 2006) (same),
with Sikes v. Global Marine, Inc., 881 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that
actions taken in violation of the stay are only voidable), and Bronson v. United States,
46 F.3d 1573, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (same). The automatic stay is so important, that
if one violates it, the bankruptcy court may award punitive damages, including costs
and attorneys fees, to the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1); see also Kassover v. Computer
Depot, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1205, 1213-14 (D. Minn. 1987) (awarding attorneys’ fees to
defendants who moved to dismiss securities class action filed in violation of the
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can—and often do—move to lift the automatic stay “for cause,”74 this
proves difficult. The bankruptcy courts have relied on aspects inherent
in all securities litigation to justify the refusal to lift the automatic stay.
For example, the bankruptcy courts refuse to lift the automatic stay
because shareholders’ claims are subordinated under the Code, so they
will likely recover nothing.75 Further, bankruptcy courts conclude that
the extensive discovery likely to result from securities litigation will
impair the debtor’s fresh start, and thus refuse to lift the stay.76
Second, some federal circuits do not permit a proof of claim to be
filed in bankruptcy on behalf of a class.7 7 All creditors, including

automatic stay).
74. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (“On request of a party in interest and after notice and a
hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this
section, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay—(1)
for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of such
party in interest . . . .”). Whether cause exists is determined case by case. See In re
ComDisco, Inc., 271 B.R. 273, 276 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002).
75. In re Chan, 355 B.R. 494, 498 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006) (stating that if the claim
is going to be discharged in a no-asset case, there is no purpose to further litigation to
determine the extent and existence of liability); In re ComDisco, Inc., 271 B.R. at 28081; In re Towner Petroleum Co., 48 B.R. 182, 184-85 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1985); see
also 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (1984) (“[A] claim arising from rescission of a purchase or sale
of a security of the debtor or of an affiliate of the debtor, for damages arising from the
purchase or sale of such a security . . . shall be subordinated to all claims or interests
that are senior to or equal the claim or interest represented by such security, except that
if such security is common stock, such claim has the same priority as common stock.”);
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).
76. See ProvinceTown Boston Airline, Inc. v. Miller (In re ProvinceTown Boston
Airline, Inc.), 52 B.R. 620, 624 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985).;see also Adelphia Commc’ns
Corp. v. Rigas (In re Adelphia Commc’ns, Corp.), 293 B.R. 337, 357-58 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2003) (extending automatic stay to preserve the “level playing field” the
bankruptcy court had effected with securities fraud claimants and non-debtors); In re
Rickel Home Ctrs. Inc., 199 B.R. 498, 501 (Bankr. D. Del. 1996) (issuing automatic
stay because of discovery concerns); In re Circle K Corp., 121 B.R. 257, 261 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 1990) (extending automatic stay to directors and officers because of discovery
concerns); Stoller v. Baldwin-United Corp., 41 B.R. 884, 890-92 (D.C. Ohio 1984)
(extending the automatic stay to non-debtors because plaintiffs could benefit from
bankruptcy discovery and thus, refrain from engaging in civil discovery). But cf. In re
LJM2 Co-Inv., L.P., 327 B.R. 786, 795 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005) (lifting the stay to
allow for limited discovery).
77. Sheftelman v. Standard Metals Corp. (In re Standard Metals Corp.), 817 F.2d
625, 631-32 (10th Cir. 1987); see also In re W.R. Grace & Co., 316 F. App’x 134, 136
(3d Cir. 2009) (nonprecedential decision).
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securities fraud plaintiffs, must file a proof of claim during the
bankruptcy proceedings to preserve their claim against the debtor.78
However, individual suits for securities fraud are often uneconomical, so
the claims are aggregated in the form of a class action.79 Although
persons who have already filed a proof of claim in bankruptcy can later
request the bankruptcy court to certify them as a class,80 the courts
disagree on whether a person can file a class proof of claim on behalf of
others who have yet to file a proof of claim.81 This disagreement stems
from Bankruptcy Rule 3001, which requires that a proof of claim be
executed by the “creditor or the creditor’s authorized agent.”82 Courts
that do not allow class proofs of claims on behalf of persons yet to file
reason that lead plaintiffs are not “authorized agents” per the text and
that class actions have limited utility in bankruptcy since a bankruptcy
proceeding is already a collective proceeding similar to a class action.83
Third, the bankruptcy priority rules act as a barrier to securities
fraud claims because they diminish the prospects of any significant
recovery. Section 1129(b) and Section 510(b) of the Code (collectively,
78. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003. The bankruptcy court sets a bar date before which all
creditors must file their proofs of claim. Id. A court may extend this time for cause or
excusable neglect. See In re Pettibone Corp., 123 B.R. 304, 308 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1990).
79. E.g., David S. Evans, Class Certification, the Merits, and Expert Evidence, 11
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2002); James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class
Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 497 (1997); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417
U.S. 156, 185–86 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
80. See, e.g., In re Standard Metals Corp., 817 F.2d at 631-32; In re FirstPlus Fin.,
Inc., 248 B.R. 60, 69 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000).
81. Compare Reid v. White Motor Corp., 886 F.2d 1462, 1470 (6th Cir. 1989)
(permitting class proof of claim), and In re Charter Co., 876 F.2d 866, 873 (11th Cir.
1989) (same), and Birting Fisheries, Inc. v. Lane (In re Birting Fisheries, Inc.), 92 F.3d
939, 939-40 (9th Cir. 1990) (same), and In re Am. Reserve Corp., 840 F.2d 487, 493
(7th Cir. 1988) (same), with In re Standard Metals Corp., 817 F.2d at 632 (denying
class proof of claim), and In re Amdura Corp., 130 B.R. 575 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991)
(same), and In re Texaco Inc., 81 B.R. 820 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (same).
82. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(b).
83. In re Computer Learning Ctrs., Inc., 344 B.R. 79, 91-93 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006).
For a full discussion of this approach, see Luisa Kaye, Note, The Case Against Class
Proofs of Claim in Bankruptcy, 66 N.Y.U.L. REV. 897 (1991). But see In re Charter
Co., 876 F.2d at 873 (arguing that although class members do not consent to original
filing beforehand, it is inherent in the nature of a class action and that class filing cannot
prejudice the class members in any way because class action procedures, such as notice,
representatives of the named class members, and opt-out provisions, protect their
interests).
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the “absolute priority rule”) make any victory private securities fraud
plaintiffs might obtain in the bankruptcy court a hollow one by
subordinating a securities fraud claim to all other claims in bankruptcy.84
This rule of absolute priority requires that creditors take before
shareholders.85 Plans of reorganization must classify claims, with
different classes receiving different orders of priority for payment, and,
under the priority rules, unless creditors are paid in full (or unless each
class of creditors consents otherwise) the debtor’s shareholders are not
entitled to recover any property through the bankruptcy process.86 In the
normal course of Chapter 11, creditors (secured and unsecured) take
before the shareholders, the plaintiffs in a securities fraud suit.87 These
84. Gen. Holdings, LLC v. S&J Diving, Inc. (In re Seaquest Diving, LP), 579 F.3d
411 (5th Cir. 2009).
85. The absolute priority rule has its roots in Northern Pacific v. Boyd, 228 U.S.
482 (1913). At the time of Boyd, it was standard practice in receiverships (the
predecessors to modern bankruptcy proceedings) to give old bondholders a stake in the
new company and ask shareholders to contribute new cash in return for continuing their
interest, but to exclude general unsecured creditors. SKEEL, JR., supra note 9, at 67.
After Northern Pacific Railway was reorganized, one of the general unsecured creditors
argued to the Supreme Court that reorganizers should not be allowed to give an ongoing
interest to shareholders without giving anything to unsecured creditors. Id. The
Supreme Court agreed and the ‘absolute priority rule’ was born. Id. Congress enacted
Section 510(b) in response to a line of decisions in which some courts allowed
shareholders equal priority with unsecured creditors when bringing securities fraud
claims. Int’l Wireless Commc’ns, Inc. v. Int’l Wireless Commc’ns Holdings, Inc. (In re
Int’l Wireless Commc’ns Holdings, Inc.), 68 F. App’x 275, 278 (3d Cir. 2003) (nonprecedential disposition). In a seminal law review article, this approach was criticized
by John J. Slain and Homer Kripke. Slain and Kripke argued that shareholders assumed
two risks: (1) the risk of business insolvency from whatever cause; and (2) the risk of
illegality in securities issuance. John J. Slain & Homer Kripke, The Interface Between
Securities Regulation and Bankruptcy – Allocating the Risk of Illegal Securities
Issuance Between Securityholders and the Issuer’s Creditors, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 261,
286 (1973). The absolute priority rule is also used to subordinate directors’ and
officers’ claims for indemnification of costs associated with defending against securities
fraud litigation. See, e.g., In re Mid-Am. Waste Sys., Inc., 228 B.R. 816, 829 (Bankr.
D. Del. 1999).
86. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). The entire “plan” process may be shortcircuited by the sale of the business under § 363, which often results in inadequate
recovery by small creditors. Mendales, supra note 33, at 992.
87. Any class (including the class of unsecured creditors) may reject the plan and
then the plan cannot be confirmed. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a). But the debtor may confirm
the plan by cramming it down the throat of the rejecting class under Section 1129(b) if:
(1) the plan does not discriminate unfairly between the classes; and (2) it is fair and
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shareholders take last, because, just as they gladly accept the upside
potential increases in their shares’ value, whatever the reason, they also
assume the risk of decline in value for whatever the reason, including
fraud.88 If shareholders are permitted to rescind their stock purchase, the
risk of securities fraud then would be impermissibly shifted to the
general, unsecured creditors, who purchased no stock.89 The absolute
priority rule makes it unlikely that securities fraud plaintiffs will receive
any distribution,90 and so has the practical effect of prohibiting securities
equitable. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS 655-56 (5th ed. 2006). “In the bankruptcy reorganizations of large, publicly
held companies, plans are rarely crammed down against resisting classes of creditors or
shareholders. There is a widespread belief among practitioners that cram down is
expensive and impractical.” Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate
Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141
U. PA. L. REV. 669, 682 (1993).
88. In re Int’l Wireless Commc’ns Holdings, Inc., 68 F. App’x at 278; In re
Worldcom, Inc., 329 B.R. 10, 14 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Obviously, the sophisticated
and intelligent persons and firms who invested in Worldcom, Enron, Global Crossing,
and the whole litany of corporate fiascos of recent years never imagined that their
investments would be subjected to the kinds of risks that brought these and many other
companies into bankruptcy in recent years. But the plain fact is that all of these
debacles happened, and when [the investors] purchased their stock, that is exactly what
they ‘subscribed’ to, just like all the other disappointed investors in this or any other era
of capitalism.”); John J. Rapisardi, Subordination of Claims Relating to Stock-Based
Compensation, 239 N.Y.L.J. 3 (May 14, 2008).
89. Melanie J. Schmid, Note, A Congressional Montage of Two Systems of Law Mandatory Subordination Under the Code, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 361, 364
(2005). Section 510(b) subordinates all securities claims, regardless of nature, scope, or
extent of risk. E.g., SeaQuest Diving, LP v. S&J Diving, Inc. (In re SeaQuest Diving,
LP), 579 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2009); In re Am. Wagering, Inc., 493 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th
Cir. 2007); In re Worldcom, Inc., 329 B.R. 10, 14 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005). So long as
the nature of the harm complained of by a shareholder results from the purchase or sale
of securities, the claim falls within Section 510(b)—even absent an allegation of fraud.
Baroda Hill Invs., Ltd. v. Telegroup, Inc. (In re Telegroup, Inc.), 281 F.3d 133, 140-42
(3d Cir. 2002); In re Worldcom, Inc., 329 B.R. at 14; see also In re SeaQuest Diving,
LP, 579 F.3d 411 (subordinating claim under 510(b) because it arose from purchase of
securities and transaction was rescinded and no fraud took place); Laurence May,
Claimants Fight Subordination: The Expansion of Section 510(b) Continues, 242
N.Y.L.J. 9 (Sept. 28, 2009) (discussing recent circuit decisions that interpret Section
510(b) broadly).
90. In re ComDisco, Inc., 271 B.R. 273, 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002) (“[U]nder §
510(b) the securities fraud claims are likely to be subordinated to creditor claims, and
dealt with on the same priority as the shareholder interests. . . . The effect of that
subordination is not possible to predict with certainty. But one very real possibility is
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fraud class actions against the debtor-company by reducing the
economic incentive for litigation.91 Even Section 523(a)(19), which
specifically excepts from discharge any judgment or settlement on
account of securities fraud,92 does not ensure recovery for securities
fraud victims as it applies only to Chapter 7 cases,93 which are usually
no-asset cases.94

III. CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY’S IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVATE
SECURITIES FRAUD SUITS AGAINST NON-DEBTORS
Corporate bankruptcy spawns securities litigation that endures for
years, almost decades, after the corporation originally files for
bankruptcy.95 The extensive liability scheme under the securities laws
reaches all those involved in a stock offering marred with
misrepresentations96 and those who manipulate stock prices by fraud.97
A company’s bankruptcy may, however, shield non-debtors—like the
company’s officers and directors, underwriters, accountants, attorneys,
or stock analysts—from liability even though the securities laws would
that the plaintiff class claims will be discharged by the plan without any payment. That
will happen if the confirmed plan makes no distribution at the equity level. In other
words, if the reorganization value of the Debtor is insufficient to pay all of the $4
billion in claims (and if the creditors do not agree to a distribution at the equity level),
then by operation of law the plaintiff’s claims against the Debtor will be discharged
without any possibility of a recovery.”).
91. 2 HOWARD J. STEINBERG, BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION § 10:83 (2008).
92. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19).
93. In re WorldCom, Inc., 329 B.R. at 13.
94. Ed Flynn, et al., Chapter 7 Asset Cases, 21 AM. BANKR. INST. L.J. 22 (2003).
95. See Newby v. Enron Corp., 542 F.3d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 2008) (“In December
2001, Enron Corporation filed for bankruptcy. Seven years later, litigation involving
the Enron collapse endures.”); John Gibeaut, As WorldCom Turns, Cases Pile Up, 90
A.B.A. J. 40, 42 (Sept. 2004) (“[P]arallel proceedings have multiplied with the wave of
corporate scandals. They are especially common in securities fraud, where the sheer
volume of money and countless number of victims ensure an almost endless . . .
plaintiff procession. . .”).
96. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288-89 (2d Cir. 1969). A
fundamental purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 “was to substitute a philosophy of
full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard
of business ethics in the securities industry.” SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
97. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
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hold them accountable. This non-debtor protection inhibits investor
recovery for fraud and subverts the aims of the securities laws.
This Part shows that a company’s bankruptcy can deter investor
suits for fraud against non-debtors. First, there is some suggestion that
bankruptcy courts can void pre-petition settlements with non-debtors,
thereby undoing any recovery investors achieved.98 Second, bankruptcy
courts can prevent any adjudication of non-debtors’ liability by
extending the automatic stay, which turns into a de facto release from
liability.99 Further still, securities fraud actions against non-debtors may
be uneconomical after a company files for bankruptcy because of
duplicative discovery costs; one appellate court has even concluded that
certification of a class action against a non-debtor is an abuse of
discretion when the claim may be resolved as part of the company’s
bankruptcy.100 Last, non-debtors may be released from liability for
securities fraud through the debtor’s reorganization plan.101
A. VOIDING PRE-PETITION SETTLEMENTS WITH NON-DEBTORS
A corporation’s bankruptcy can affect securities fraud settlements
entered into with non-debtors before the bankruptcy filing. For
example, the debtor-company’s bankruptcy trustee may attempt to void
a pre-petition settlement between plaintiff-investors and the debtorcompany’s directors and officers if that settlement utilized certain
insurance proceeds.102 The trustee may argue that the settlement
constituted a voidable preference or fraudulent conveyance under the
Code.103 In In re Imperial, plaintiff-investors brought a securities fraud

98. See supra Part III.A.
99. See supra Part III.B.
100. See supra Part III.C.
101. See supra Part III.D.
102. See Imperial Corp. of Am. v. Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Specthrie & Lerach (In
re Imperial Corp. of Am.), 144 B.R. 115, 116 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1992); Durkin v.
Shields (In re Imperial Corp. of Am.), No. 92-1003-IEG (LSP), 1997 WL 808631, at *1
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 1997); Durkin v. Shields (In re Imperial Corp. of Am.), No. 921003-IEG (LSP), 1997 WL 808628, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 1997).
103. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (stating that the trustee may avoid any transfer made for
the benefit of a creditor on the account of antecedent debt made while the debtor was
insolvent if it is made within 90 days before the date of the filing of the debtor’s
petition); 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (enabling a trustee to avoid a transfer if it was made by the
debtor with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors).
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class action against Imperial’s officers and directors.104 The parties
settled and the settlement was funded mostly by Imperial’s insurer.105
Imperial filed for bankruptcy a few days after the court approved the
class’s attorney’s fees.106 Imperial’s bankruptcy trustee sought to avoid
the settlement and claimed that the insurance proceeds were estate
property, thereby making the settlement a preferential transfer.107
Although the court refused the trustee’s avoidance action, it only did so
because it found that the insurance proceeds were not property of the
estate: the policy provided direct coverage to the officers and directors,
as opposed to entity or indirect coverage.108 Imperial makes clear that
the outcome of such an avoidance action depends on the type of
coverage. It suggests that indirect or entity coverage—property of the
estate109—may justify voiding a pre-petition, non-debtor settlement if
the other elements for a voidable transfer are met.110
B. DE FACTO RELEASES: THE AUTOMATIC STAY AND
DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
“It is commonplace for securities fraud actions to be pending
against officers and directors of a debtor that is concurrently in a case
under the Bankruptcy Code.”111 When a company with public debt or
equity gets into financial difficulty, directors and officers are often
targeted by securities fraud plaintiffs who complain that the directors
and officers failed to adequately disclose the pre-bankruptcy condition

104. In re Imperial Corp. of Am., 144 B.R. at 117.
105. Id. Under the settlement agreement, a settlement fund was created, which
included $13 million in cash and 1.5 million warrants for the purchase of stock at $2.50
per share. Durkin, 1997 WL 808631, at *1. Imperial’s D&O insurer provided $12.5
million to the settlement fund. Id.
106. In re Imperial Corp. of Am., 144 B.R. at 117.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 117-18.
109. See supra Part III.B (discussing when insurance is considered property of the
estate).
110. John Collen, Bankruptcy and D&O Insurance, 11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 121,
142-43 (2002).
111. In re Recoton, Corp., 307 B.R. 751, 759 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also In
re DVI Inc. Sec. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 196, 198 (E.D. Pa. 2008); In re First Cent. Fin.
Corp., 238 B.R. 9, 15 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999); In re Mortg. & Realty Trust, 125 B.R.
575, 578 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991).

394

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVI

of the company.112
A company’s bankruptcy can prevent the
adjudication of a non-debtor’s liability for securities fraud. This is quite
remarkable given that Congress explicitly relegated securities claims to
the federal courts—and not the bankruptcy courts—when it enacted the
“reference” provisions of the Code.113 Contrary to Congress’s intent to
leave securities litigation to federal district court, bankruptcy courts

112. THOMAS J. SALERNO, ET AL., THE EXECUTIVE GUIDE TO CORPORATE
BANKRUPTCY,104 (2001). “[W]hether a company can continue as a going concern can
become an allegation in a shareholders’ class action complaint. For example, the
complaint in a recent securities suit against NextWave Wireless alleges that the
company had concealed questions surrounding its ability to continue as a going
concern.” Kevin LaCroix, Corporate Defaults, Bankruptcies, and D&O Claims, IV
INSIGHTS,2-3 (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.oakbridgeins.com/newsletter.htm.
Corporations are in a precarious position disclosing bankruptcy prospects. Whether the
company will plunge into bankruptcy is a material fact that any reasonable investor
would want to know. But if the company is on the verge of bankruptcy, disclosing that
information will likely result in a significant drop in the company’s stock price, pushing
them into bankruptcy and impairing the company’s ability to finalize any deals. If the
company does not disclose the situation, the company risks investor suits, but may be
able to keep the company from slipping into insolvency. See Miller v. Champion
Enters., Inc., 346 F.3d 660, 682 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that because of this doubleeffect, the defendant-corporation’s refusal to disclose bankruptcy information was not
an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care and thus did not amount to a
strong inference of recklessness).
113. Under the mandatory withdrawal provisions of the Code, a district court must
withdraw the bankruptcy court’s reference if the proceedings require consideration of
both the Code and other federal laws. 28 U.S.C. § 157(d). Congress specifically
contemplated securities cases when it enacted the mandatory withdrawal portion of
Section 157(d) of the Code. In the floor debate, a House Representative stated that the
mandatory withdrawal provision would apply to “related causes which may require
consideration of both title 11 issues and other federal laws including cases involving the
National Labor Relations Act, civil rights law, Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,
and other similar laws.” 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 3-53 n.114 (quoting 130 Cong.
Rec. H1850 (Mar. 21, 1984)) (emphasis added). But courts disagree as to the meaning
of “other federal law” with some courts concluding that mandatory withdrawal is
required whenever consideration of the federal law is involved, see, e.g., Burger King
Corp. v. B-K of Kansas, Inc., 64 B.R. 728, 730 (D. Kan. 1986), and others concluding
that mandatory withdrawal is required when only the federal law is necessary for the
resolution of the case, see, e.g., Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. v. Rigas (In re Adelphia
Commc’ns Corp.), No. 02 Civ. 8495 GBD, 2003 WL 21297258, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June
4, 2003); Randall v. Am. Solar King Corp. (In re Am. Solar King Corp.), 92 B.R. 207,
210 (W.D. Tex. 1988); Price v. Craddock, 85 B.R. 570, 572 (D. Colo. 1988); In re
White Motor Corp., 42 B.R. 693 (N.D. Ohio 1984); In re Chan, 355 B.R. 494, 506
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006).
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impede this litigation by extending the automatic stay.
Under the Code, directors and officers cannot avail themselves of
the corporation’s automatic stay because it is for the benefit of the
debtor.114 In theory, while the corporation is in bankruptcy, securities
fraud plaintiffs should be able to pursue their claims against corporate
officers and other liable parties.115 However, directors and officers
attempt to extend the automatic stay to these securities fraud suits. Even
though this protection is not permanent (and thus distinct from an actual
discharge or release, as discussed in Part III.D.),116 for practical
purposes, if the directors and officers can extend automatic stay
protection, the plaintiff-investors will settle their claims against the
directors and officers as part of the company’s plan of reorganization.117
114. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)-(3); see also McCartney v. Integra Nat’l Bank N., 106
F.3d 506, 509-10 (3d Cir. 1997).
115. One of the reviewers of this Article notes that generally a securities fraud case
against non-debtors goes forward without the debtor-company named in the suit. So, in
practice, whether the court should extend the automatic stay usually is not an issue.
Nevertheless, in the cases in which it does arise, it presents a considerable problem
worthy of attention. See, e.g., In re Phil. Newspapers, LLC, 407 B.R. 606, 615 (E.D.
Pa. 2009); In re Cont’l Airlines, 177 B.R. 475, 479-81 (D. Del. 1993); In re Shearin
Family Invs., LLC, No. 08-07082-8-JRL, 2009 WL 4042670, at *1-*2 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. Nov. 19, 2009); In re SN Liquidation, Inc., 388 B.R. 579, 585 (Bankr. D. Del.
2008). Further, the existence of the possibility of a procedural bar such as the automatic
stay will likely influence settlement values. As cases abound in which directors and
officers have moved to extend automatic stay protection, see, e.g., In re MCSi, Inc., 371
B.R. 270 (S.D. Ohio 2007); In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 261 B.R. 534, 535 (S.D. Fla.
2001); In re Uni-Marts, LLC, 404 B.R. 767, 780-82 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009); In re
Trans-Service Logistics, Inc., 304 B.R. 805, 807 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2004); In re
marchFIRST, Inc., 288 B.R. 526, 527-28 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002); and the possibility of
extending the stay rises, costs increase and the plaintiff’s probability assessment of the
chance of a successful verdict must account for this adverse possibility, thus lowering
settlement values. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 568 (6th ed.
2003) (discussing how settlement is a product of the probability of success on the merits
less litigation costs).
116. After a debtor receives a discharge in bankruptcy, the automatic stay is
replaced with a section 524 post discharge injunction. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2). This postdischarge injunction, however, does not affect the enforceability of any non-debtor
liability for pre-petition debt. Patronite v. Beeney (In re Beeney), 142 B.R. 360, 362
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1992); In re W. Real Estate Fund, Inc., 922 F.2d 592, 600 (10th Cir.
1990).
117. SALERNO, ET AL., supra note 112, at 105. A bankruptcy court can extend the
automatic stay under both Section 362 and its general injunctive power under Section
105. In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 261 B.R. 534, 536 (S.D. Fla. 2001). One of the central
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Thus, extension of the automatic stay allows these claims to be resolved
in the company’s bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy courts have extended automatic stay protection to
corporate directors and officers under the guise of “unusual
circumstances.”118 Unusual circumstances exist if there is sufficient
identity between the debtor and the third party such that the debtor may
be considered the real party defendant and a judgment against the third
party will act as a judgment against the debtor.119 Directors and officers
advance four “unusual circumstances” to extend automatic stay
protection: (1) that a securities fraud suit will involve extensive
discovery; (2) that the directors and officers are indemnified by the
corporation’s insurance, which constitutes property of the estate; (3) that
the directors and officers are integral to the debtor’s reorganization
efforts; and (4) that findings in the suit against the directors and officers
may bind the debtor through collateral estoppel or res judicata.120 These
issues in surviving to plan confirmation is protecting the directors and officers from
securities fraud lawsuits. SALERNO, ET AL., supra note 112, at 104.
118. In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 261 B.R. at 536. Section 105(a) provides that a
bankruptcy court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). Relief under
Section 105 includes an injunction. ProvinceTown Boston Airline Inc. v. Miller (In re
ProvinceTown Boston Airline, Inc.), 52 B.R. 620, 624 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985). An
injunction under Section 105(a) is an extraordinary remedy and more than perceived
necessity is required to demonstrate its appropriateness. E.g., In re First Cent. Fin.
Corp., 238 B.R. 9, 20 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999). The party seeking the injunction must
show: (1) a strong probability on the merits; (2) irreparable injury if the relief sought is
not granted; (3) the injunction will not cause substantial harm; and (4) the injunction
will best serve the public interest. In re ProvinceTown Boston Airline, Inc., 52 B.R. at
624-25 (collecting cases). Another source of equitable power is Section 1123(b)(6),
which allows a Chapter 11 plan to include any appropriate provision so long as it is
consistent with the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(6).
119. A.H. Robins Co., Inc. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 999-1002 (4th Cir. 1986); In
re Family Health Servs., Inc., 105 B.R. 937,942 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989); Rickel Home
Ctrs., Inc. v. Baffa (In re Rickel Home Ctrs., Inc.), 199 B.R. 498, 500 (Bankr. D. Del.
1996). This is an exception to the plain text of Section 362(a) which provides stay
protection to the debtor alone, and thus, it is interpreted narrowly. See In re First Cent.
Fin. Corp., 238 B.R. at 19.
120. See, e.g., In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 261 B.R. at 536; In re Reliance
Acceptance Grp., Inc., 235 B.R. 548, 556 (D. Del. 1999); JNA-1 Corp. v. Uni-Marts,
LLC (In re Uni-Marts, LLC), 404 B.R. 767, 780-81 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009). Not all
courts though have extended the automatic stay to directors and officers. See, e.g., In re
MCSi, Inc., Sec. Litig., 371 B.R. 270, 274 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (refusing to extend stay
because directors and officers were not entitled to insurance proceeds); Catholic Order
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“unusual circumstances” are not so unusual at all, however; in fact, they
exist in every securities fraud suit. Further, the arguments are usually
flawed in that they rely on faulty or untested premises. This Part
explores each of these arguments.
1. Discovery Concerns
In a related context where the debtor-company seeks to keep the
stay in place to deny its directors and officers access to insurance funds,
these companies argue that the stay should not be lifted because
securities fraud actions involve extensive and intensive discovery.121
This reasoning is equally applicable to a non-debtor’s effort to extend
the stay. Excessive and intensive discovery is a common criticism of
securities fraud class actions.122 The courts have been receptive to this
discovery concern and have refused to lift the stay (or be persuaded to
extend its protection) even if the action is already filed in federal court
and discovery already has begun.123 They want to protect the debtor

of Foresters v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1162-63 (N.D.
Iowa 2004) (refusing to extend the stay because the non-debtor did not demonstrate
unusual circumstances); In re Trans-Serv. Logistics, Inc., 304 B.R. 805, 808 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 2004) (refusing to extend the stay because the case involved only a single
and straight-forward lawsuit); Maxwell v. Megliola (In re marchFIRST, Inc.), 288 B.R.
526, 529-30 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002) (refusing to extend the stay because the insurance
proceeds were not property of the estate); In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 261 B.R. at 536-37
(refusing to extend the stay because insurance proceeds were not property of the estate);
Gray v. Hirsch, 230 B.R. 239, 243-44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (refusing to extend stay
because suit would have no effect on debtor); In re Rickel Home Ctrs., Inc., 199 B.R. at
500-01 (refusing to extend stay because non-debtors could not demonstrate unusual
circumstances); In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 104 B.R. 582, 584 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1989) (refusing to extend stay where the non-debtor’s liability rests on his own breach
of duty).
121. See, e.g., Scott B. Schreiber & Andrew T. Karron, Back to the Future: The
New Focus on Predictions as a Basis for Securities Fraud Claims, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 73 (1994); Shannon Rose Seldon, (Self-)Policing the Market: Congress’s Flawed
Approach to Securities Law Reform, 33 J. LEGIS. 57, 75 (2006).
122. E.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741, (1974)
(stating that the potential for abuse of the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure may exist in securities litigation more than any other litigation, that
extensive depositions of directors and officers takes up the time of a number of people,
and in sum, forces defendants in terrorem into settlement).
123. See In re ProvinceTown Boston Airline, Inc., 52 B.R. 620, 623 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1985). ProvinceTown Boston Airline, Inc. (PBA) was one of the largest operators
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from the bombardment of discovery that would impede reorganization
efforts.124
But the argument rests on the faulty premise that discovery in
securities fraud litigation is abusive and wrongly forces defendants to
settle. This widespread sentiment has not been empirically verified.12 5
Furthermore, imposing high discovery costs is inconsistent with rational
behavior for plaintiff-investors: plaintiff-investors front the cost of
litigation (when victory is uncertain) and high discovery costs for
defendants decrease available insurance proceeds—a vital source of
funding for settlement or judgment if the company is in bankruptcy.126

of a commuter airline. Id. at 622. The plaintiffs, shareholders of PBA’s, filed suits
against PBA and its directors, officers, and underwriter alleging that PBA failed to
disclose in its prospectus accompanying its IPO certain charges and administrative
actions by the Federal Aviation Authority against PBA which resulted in the revocation
of PBA’s operating certificate. Id., see also The Securities Act of 1933 § 12(2). After
PBA filed for bankruptcy, the plaintiffs sought to lift the automatic stay to proceed
against PBA, and PBA, in response sought an extension of the automatic stay to its
related non-debtors. In re ProvinceTown Boston Airline, Inc., 52 B.R. at 622. The
district court ultimately refused to extend the automatic stay because several of the nondebtors were no longer officers or directors, were never officers or directors, or had no
connection with the debtor. Id. at 626.
124. In re ProvinceTown Boston Airline, Inc., 52 B.R. at 624; see also In re
Towner Petroleum Co., 48 B.R. 182, 185, 191 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1985) (refusing to
lift automatic stay where debtor and non-debtors would be subject to extensive
discovery from fraud case involving oil and gas leases); cf. Hoenig v. Hoffman (In re
Hoffman), 33 B.R. 937, 941 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983) (allowing limited discovery).
125. See Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of
Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46
STAN. L. REV. 1393 (1994) (documenting, “Faludi-style,” the myth of pervasive
discovery abuse); Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on
Civil Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785, 787 (1998) (stating that the debate over discovery
reform was based on salient personal experiences, and not with the benefit of empirical
evidence). But there is still no working definition of what constitutes “appropriate”
discovery. Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The
Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REV. 683, 688 (1998).
126. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors’ and
Officers’ Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 777-78 (2009).
D&O policies are “wasting” policies. Thomas A. Dubbs, A Scotch Verdict on
“Circularity” and Other Issues, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 455, 462 n.28 (2009). A “wasting”
policy is an insurance policy whereby the costs of defense are taken off the top and
“waste” away at the policy; as litigation progresses, the available insurance funds
reduces. Judge Nicholas H. Politan, Mediating Securities Class Actions: A View from
the Captain’s Quarters, 800 PLI/Lit 133, 137 (2009).

2011] BANKRUPTCY’S PROTECTION FOR NON-DEBTORS
FROM SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION

399

2. Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance
Nearly all public companies have some form of directors’ and
officers’ (“D&O”) liability insurance to protect them from securities
litigation.127 A D&O liability insurance policy, generally an indemnity
policy,128 offers three types of coverage: (1) direct (or “Side-A”)
coverage;129 (2) indirect (or “Side B”) coverage; and (3) entity (or “Side
C”) coverage.130 Direct coverage provides insurance coverage for any
actual or alleged wrongful acts by the directors or officers while acting
in their official capacities (unless the company has already indemnified
them).131 Direct coverage is the only kind of coverage that actually

127. Seth Van Aalten, Note, D&O Insurance in the Age of Enron: Protecting
Officers and Directors in Corporate Bankruptcies, 22 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L.
457 460 (2003). The deductibles tend to be substantial. DICTIONARY OF INSURANCE
TERMS 134 (4th ed. 2000). D&O policies provide an incentive for directors and officers
to make risky decisions necessary to corporate growth. Eric W. Collins, Note, Level 3
v. Federal Insurance: Do You Know What is in Your Directors and Officers Liability
Insurance Policy, 73 UMKC L. REV. 199, 208 (2004).
D&O insurance was first introduced after the enactment of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, but
it was not widely purchased until after the Supreme Court decided Basic v. Levinson,
where the Supreme Court created a presumption of reliance for lawsuits involving
securities traded in the secondary public markets, now known as the fraud-on-themarket theory. Van Aalten, supra note 127, at 460; Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224, 246-47 (1988). The result of the Basic decision was an upsurge in securities class
actions and expanded liability as it allowed for widely dispersed investors to aggregate
small claims and threaten a company with daunting damages. A.C. Pritchard,
Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta: The Political Economy of
Securities Class Action Reform, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 217 (2008).
128. SUSAN N.K. GUMMOW, BANKRUPTCY AND INSURANCE LAW MANUAL 133 (3d
ed. 2009). These D&O policies differ from traditional professional liability policies in
that the D&O policies do not obligate the insurer to provide a defense, but only to
reimburse expenses incurred in defense of the claims against the insured. Lee R. Russ
& Thomas F. Segalla, Directors and Officers: General Coverage Terms, in 9A COUCH
ON INSURANCE, § 131:31 (2009).
129. Direct insurance coverage generally comes into play when the company is
insolvent. Bonnie Brewer Cavanaugh, Looking for Trouble: With Litigation Rising,
Insurers Advise Companies to Shore Up Their Liability Defenses, 109 BEST’S REV. 49
(Mar. 2009).
130. GUMMOW, supra note 128, at 133-34.
131. GUMMOW, supra note 128, at 133. Covered losses include compensatory
damages, settlements, and legal fees incurred by the person in connection with service
as a director/officer of the corporation. Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why
the SEC Should Mandate Disclosure of Details Concerning Directors’ and Officers’
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covers the individual directors and officers.132 Conversely, indirect
coverage provides the company with insurance coverage when the
company has indemnified its directors or officers for a loss.133 Last,
entity coverage insures the company for any claims brought against it.134
If the company has D&O insurance (and well-over ninety percent
of public companies do13 5), the bankruptcy court may extend automatic
stay protection so long as the insurance policy and its proceeds are
considered property of the company’s bankruptcy estate.136 Officers and
directors argue that allowing a shareholder’s claim to go forward will
harm the debtor-company by diminishing funds available under the
D&O policies through defense costs and judgment awards, thereby
adversely affecting property of the estate.137 The majority of the federal
circuits state that insurance policies are property of the estate and
protected by the automatic stay,138 but whether the proceeds from a
D&O policy are property of the estate is assessed case by case.139
Liability Insurance Policies, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1164 (2006). According to most
policies, a director or officer usually includes any past, present, or future director or
officer of the company. Russ & Segalla, supra note 128.
132. Griffith, supra note 131, at 1164.
133. GUMMOW, supra note 128, at 133.
134. GUMMOW, supra note 128 at 134.
135. Griffith, supra note 131, at 1168.
136. See, e.g., Bidermann Indus. USA Inc. v. Zelnik (In re Bidermann Indus. USA,
Inc.), 200 B.R. 779 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (recognizing that Section 362 stays actions
that interfere with property of the estate, and that if insurance policies are used to satisfy
judgments against non-debtors and debtor has an interest in those proceeds, the
insurance policies may be property of the estate); Maxicare Health Plans v. Centinela
Mammoth Hosp. (In re Family Health Servs., Inc.), 105 B.R. 937, 942-43 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1989). The automatic stay precludes any act to obtain possession of property of the
estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3); see also Circle K Corp. v. Marks (In re Circle K Corp.),
121 B.R. 257, 258, 261 (Bankr. N.D. Ariz. 1990).
137. In re Reliance Acceptance Grp., Inc., 235 B.R. 548, 556-57 (D. Del. 1999).
138. See, e.g., MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville, Corp. (In re Johns-Manville
Corp.), 837 F.2d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 1988); A.H. Robins Co., Inc. v. Piccinin (In re A.H.
Robins, Co., Inc.), 788 F.2d 994, 1001 (4th Cir. 1986); In re Davis, 730 F.2d 176, 184
(5th Cir. 1984); In re First Cent. Fin. Corp., 238 B.R. 9, 16 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999).
139. See Houston v. Edgeworth, (In re Edgeworth), 993 F.2d 51, 56 (5th Cir. 1993);
In re Metro. Mortg. & Sec. Co., Inc., 325 B.R. 851, 857-58 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005)
(stating that an insurance policy is not property of the estate where the debtor has no
legal interest in the proceeds); In re Sfuzzi, Inc., 191 B.R. 664, 668 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1996). The distinction between the insurance policy and its proceeds is necessary as a
practical matter: the bankruptcy courts want to allow directors and officers to obtain
insurance proceeds, but also prohibit the debtor’s insurer from cancelling the policy.
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Generally, if the D&O policy provides direct coverage, then the
proceeds are not property of the estate and the bankruptcy court will not
extend the automatic stay.140 Similarly, if the debtor’s plan of
reorganization extinguishes directors’ and officers’ claims under D&O
policies, the automatic stay should not be extended.141 For indirect and
entity coverage situations, however, if the debtor-company is exposed in
any way to claims covered under the D&O policy, the proceeds are
property of the estate.142
If both the directors, officers, and the company have an interest in
the insurance proceeds, the bankruptcy court will extend the automatic
stay to prevent competition for policy proceeds.14 3 This competition
Cf. In re Minoco, Grp. of Cos., Ltd., 799 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1986).
140. See La. World Exposition, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co. (In re La. World Exposition,
Inc.), 832 F.2d 1391, 1400-01 (5th Cir. 1987).
141. See In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 261 B.R. 534, 537 (S.D. Fla. 2001). In In re
Sunbeam, Sunbeam filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and its directors and officers sought
to extend the automatic stay to securities litigation against them. Id. at 535. The court
refused to extend the stay because: (1) Sunbeam did not also seek extension of the stay,
indicating that these managers were not necessary to reorganization; (2) Sunbeam was
not required to indemnify the non-debtors for any costs or judgments; and (3) the
recovery from the managers’ insurance would not effect the debtor’s recovery because
the debtor had no right to those proceeds. Id. at 536-37.
142. In re CHS Elec., Inc., 261 B.R. 538 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2001) (stating that entity
coverage itself does not mean that the proceeds are property of the estate because “in
actuality,” there was no entity coverage); see also In re First Cent. Fin. Corp., 238 B.R.
9, 17 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999) (same); but see In re Vitek, 51 F.3d 530, 534 (5th Cir.
1995) (stating that where a D&O policy provides coverage for judgments or losses
against the bankrupt corporation itself, the proceeds belong to the estate regardless of
the presence of personal liability coverage for officers and directors).
143. E.g., In re Metro. Mortg. & Sec. Co., Inc., 325 B.R. 851, 857 (Bankr. E.D.
Wash. 2005); In re First Central Fin. Corp., 238 B.R. at 17. A securities fraud claim
must have been filed against the debtor that implicates insurance coverage; if no party
expresses any interest in making these claims, a bankruptcy court should not extend
automatic stay protection to directors and officers based on mere speculation. See, e.g.,
In re Adelphia Commc’ns, Corp., 298 B.R. 49, 53-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Reliance
Acceptance Grp., Inc., 235 B.R. 548, 561 (D. Del. 1999); Official Unsecured Creditors’
Comm. v. Bowen (In re Phar-Mor, Inc., Sec. Litig.), 164 B.R. 903, 905 (W.D. Pa.
1994). In this situation, the available insurance provides no tangible benefit to the
estate. In re First Central Fin. Corp., 238 B.R. at 18. “Claiming the [debtor-company]
now h[as] a property interest in those proceeds makes no sense at this juncture. Such
argument would be akin to a car owner with collision coverage claiming he has the right
to proceeds from his policy simply because there is a prospective possibility that his car
will collide with another tomorrow, or a living person having a death benefit policy, and
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may descend into a free-for-all, causing a race to judgment or
settlement.144 This problem is exacerbated if the cost of determining
each claimant’s interest in the policy proceeds depletes the available
moneys, as in the case of a “wasting” policy.145 Under a “wasting”
policy, for every dollar paid to the officers and directors, one less dollar
of coverage is available to the debtor-company’s estate.146
Extending the stay because of the presence of insurance, however,
conflates issues of insurance coverage with the presence of a securities
fraud claim. Rather, the insured and insurer should resolve the question
of coverage without enjoining the securities fraud claim. The plaintiffinvestors pursue an action against the directors and officers, not against
the insurer.14 7 Insurers may contest coverage, making the insurer’s
involvement uncertain. For example, insurers may invoke a policy
provision for fraud exclusion,148 which excludes coverage for any loss
resulting from any profit or advantage that the director or officer
obtained by violating the securities laws.149 Similarly, insurers may
dispute whether there is a covered “loss” as defined in the policy.
Policies often define “loss” to mean damages, judgments, settlements,
If plaintiff-investors seek restitution or
and defense costs.150
disgorgement, however, it is an open question whether the claim is a
claiming his beneficiaries have a property interest in the proceeds even though he
remains alive.” In re Adelphia Commc’ns, Corp., 298 B.R. at 53-54.
144. In re Metro. Mortg. & Sec. Co., Inc., 325 B.R. at 857.
145. Id.
146. In re First Cent. Fin. Corp., 238 B.R. at 17.
147. See In re Reliance Acceptance Grp., Inc., 235 B.R. at 557; see also Boles v.
Turner (In re Envid, Inc.), 364 B.R. 139, 157 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (“The existence
of D & O Policies, which are subject to the unliquidated, contingent claims of the Plan
Trustees and the settled claims of the Shareholder Plaintiffs who have suffered a loss
within the meaning of those policies, does not form the basis for extraordinary
injunctive relief favoring the Plan Trustees over the Shareholder Plaintiffs and the D &
O Defendants simply because the Plan Trustees happen to have obtain their status
through confirmation of liquidating plans. While the amount of insurance proceeds
available to the Plan Trustees will be reduced, that is not so extraordinary a
circumstance as to warrant exercise of the Court’s limited, “related to” jurisdiction to
enter an injunction under § 105(a) . . . The right of the parties to pursue the same assets
and individuals is not, in and of itself, a cognizable theory in support of an injunction.”).
148. GUMMOW, supra note 128, at 139.
149. GUMMOW, supra note 128, at 140. This includes gains from insider trading as
well. See Alstrin v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 376, 400 (D. Del. 2002).
150. Michael J. Kaufman, Insurance, in 26A SECURITIES LITIGATION: DAMAGES §
20:28 (2010).
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covered “loss.”151 Additionally, insurers may threaten to rescind
coverage on the basis of misrepresentation in the insurance
application.152 A securities fraud suit’s effect on insurance is relevant
only between the debtor-company, the officers and directors, and the
insurers.153 The nature and amount of coverage is a matter to be
resolved between the insurers and insured, without enjoining securities
fraud plaintiffs from proceeding with their claim.154
Similarly, the policy does not provide defense funds as a matter of
right because a securities fraud claim has been filed. Defense funds are
not property of the debtor until either agreement or a finding by a
court.15 5 Even when an insurer pays for defense, it reserves its right to
contest coverage.156 Thus, not only has the debtor-corporation’s interest
151. Kaufman, supra note 150. Professor Kaufman goes on to note that this
argument is plain wrong because Section 11 and Section 12 of the 1933 Act make clear
that any recovery of damages is measured by and limited to the plaintiff’s losses, not
the disgorgement of any profit to the defendants. Id.
152. As scholars Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith explain:
Corporations typically submit a copy of their financial statements with their
application for D&O insurance, and D&O insurance underwriters commonly use
financial measures derived from the financial statements to price that insurance.
Thus, fraud in the financial statements [often the basis for 10b-5 liability] can
become fraud in the application for insurance, provided that the underwriter had
insisted that the corporation provide an application that incorporated the financial
statements and that the insurer can prove that the underwriter relied on the
fraudulent information in the statements.

Baker & Griffith, supra note 126, at 800.
153. In re Reliance Acceptance Grp., Inc., 235 B.R. 548, 557 (D. Del. 1999) (“If the
Shareholders are successful and obtain a judgment or judgments, coverage may be
relevant as a practical matter, as certain of the defendants may not have the ability to
pay any judgment. The defendants may have claims against the Company and the
insurers for indemnification. It is at that time and in that context, an action among the
Debtors, the officers and directors and the insurers, that this issue of the nature and
extent of coverage would be resolved.”).
154. Id.
155. Maxwell v. Megliola (In re Marchfirst, Inc.), 288 B.R. 526, 530 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 2002).
156. ALLAN D. WINDT, Consent By Insured to Defense Offered Subject to a
Reservation of Rights, in 1 INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 2:17 (5th ed. 2009); see
also In re Marchfirst, Inc., 288 B.R. 526, 530 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002). Many courts that
have considered whether an insured can reject an insurer’s tendered defense with a
reservation of rights have held that the insured has an absolute right to reject any
defense offered subject to a reservation of rights. E.g., City of Carter Lake v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1060 n.7 (8th Cir. 1979) (Iowa law); State ex rel.
Rimco, Inc. v. Dowd, 858 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1993);. The insurer
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in the insurance proceeds not matured, but it may never do so.157
Therefore, the presence of D&O insurance is insufficient to extend
automatic stay protection to directors and officers.
3. The Debtor-Company’s Reorganization Efforts
A key feature of Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings is that the
debtor’s management retains control of the company while in
bankruptcy.158 Based on this feature, management argues that the stay
should be extended to bar securities fraud suits against them because
their undivided attention is necessary to facilitate the debtor’s
reorganization.159 Some courts have agreed, extending the automatic
stay (or issuing an injunction) to protect non-debtors whose time and
energy should not be diverted.160
must either (1) affirm the policy, defend the suit, and pay any resulting adverse
judgment, regardless of the existence of any policy defenses; or (2) to refuse to defend
and take its chances that its denial of coverage will stand up in a later suit on the policy,
Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 281, 288 (Alaska 1980).
157. In re Marchfirst, Inc., 288 B.R. at 530.
158. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity’s Share in
the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
125, 128 (1990). When the debtor’s management retains exclusivity over presenting
the plan of confirmation, this management wields considerable power:
When exclusivity is maintained, the debtor corporation’s management drafts and
proposes a plan of reorganization after consulting and negotiating with the key
representatives of the creditors and sometimes the shareholders. Those
representatives may include “official” committees appointed by the United States
Trustee, unofficial committees organized by members of the affected group, or
other representatives, such as indenture trustees or the attorneys for the plaintiffs in
a class action. Whether or not the representatives agree to a proposed plan,
management can force a vote of the affected creditors and shareholders.

Id. at 128-29.
159. See Gray v. Hirsch, 230 B.R. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). The central purpose
of extending the automatic stay is to suspend actions that pose a serious threat to the
debtor-company’s reorganization efforts. Gerard v. W.R. Grace & Co. (In re W.R.
Grace & Co.), 115 F. App’x 565, 570 (3d Cir. 2004) (non-precedential disposition);
JNA-1 Corp. v. Uni-Marts, LLC (In re Uni-Marts, LLC), 404 B.R. 767, 780-81 (Bankr.
D. Del. 2009).
160. E.g., SALERNO, ET AL., supra note 112, at 105; see also Monarch Life Ins. Co.
v. Ropes & Gray, 65 F.3d 973, 979 (1st Cir. 1995); In re Uni-Marts, LLC 404 B.R. at
782; In re K-Mart Corp., 285 B.R. 679, 689 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002); E. Airlines, Inc. v.
Rolleston (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 111 B.R. 423, 435 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990);
Supermercado Gamboa, Inc. v. Camara de Commerciantes Mayoristas De P.R., Inc. (In
re Supermercado Gamboa), 68 B.R. 230, 233 (D. P.R. 1986); ProvinceTown Boston
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Three problems with this argument exist, however. First, whether a
director or officer’s continued service is crucial to the debtor-company’s
reorganization is a highly factual inquiry.161 If the direction of the
debtor’s bankruptcy case is already established, extending the stay is
inappropriate because the directors or officers are no longer needed to
guide the company through the bankruptcy.162 Administration connotes
planning, executive decision-making, and supervision of the bankruptcy
estate,163 and if no more planning, decision-making, or supervision is
necessary, these officers and directors no longer need the protection of
the automatic stay.
Second, the premise of the argument—that management should
guide the company through bankruptcy—is flawed. Behavioral analysis
teaches that entrenched management may impede reorganization efforts.
In the sphere of individual decision-making, people systematically
overrate their abilities and contributions, resulting in excessive optimism
and an inflated sense of ability to control events and risk.16 4 This bias

Airline, Inc. v. Miller (In re ProvinceTown Boston Airline, Inc.), 52 B.R. 620, 625-26
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985) (recognizing that courts consider officers and directors vital to
reorganization if they own assets that are used to fund the debtor’s reorganization or if
they play a significant and meaningful role in preserving the debtor’s credit); JohnsManville Corp. v. Asbestos Litig. Grp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 26 B.R. 420, 426
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
Certain factors, though, may counsel against extending the stay. For example,
bankruptcy courts are reluctant to extend the stay if the management is exposed to one
or a few suits that will not likely consume significant portions of management’s time.
In re Uni-Marts, LLC, 404 B.R. at 782. Bankruptcy courts are also hesitant to extend
automatic stay protection if the securities fraud allegations focus on the personal
misconduct of the officers and directors. Morgan v. Korbin Sec. Inc., 649 F. Supp.
1023, 1032 (N.D. Ill. 1986). It is also significant if the debtor-company does not seek
to extend the stay, or otherwise concedes that the parallel proceeding will not impair its
reorganization efforts. See, e.g., In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 261 B.R. 534, 537 (S.D. Fla.
2001).
161. See In re Baldwin-United Corp., 43 B.R. 443, 461-62 (S.D. Ohio. 1984). In
that hearing, the bankruptcy court should focus on the benefits that the debtor can
demonstrate that it would obtain from the directors’ continued services, as opposed to
the potential detriment the directors will experience. Id. at 462.
162. See In re Envid, Inc., 364 B.R. 139, 149-50 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007).
163. Id. at 149.
164. Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other Social
Harms), in BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMIS149 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); see
also Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
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may distort judgment regarding the cause of the company’s bankruptcy:
attributing the bankruptcy to an external circumstance outside of
management’s control, rather than mismanagement. Moreover, once a
person voluntarily commits to an idea or course of action, this person is
beset with a strong motivation to resist evidence that the course was illchosen.165 Thus, management already set on a way of doing things—
possibly things that led to the company’s perilous financial situation to
begin with—may disregard objective evidence that undermines their
original course of action.
Third, in reality, current management of public companies is often
ousted when the company files for bankruptcy.16 6 Bankruptcy expert
Lynn M. LoPucki debunks the idea that current officers and directors of
bankrupt companies should shepherd a corporation through
bankruptcy.167 Examining cases from 1990 through 2004, LoPucki
concluded that when a member of pre-petition management remained as
CEO through the crucial stages of the bankruptcy case, the company was
more likely to fail in the five years after it emerged from bankruptcy.168
Conversely, a company that hired a new CEO from outside the company
was more likely to succeed in the five years after it emerged from
bankruptcy.169 Retaining management premised on the idea that they
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL . L. REV. 1051, 1091-93
(2000).
165. Langevoort, supra note 164, at 149, 151 (“Self-confidence and external image
are threatened both by introducing a troubling awareness of the possibility of mistake,
and by raising the need to consider a reversal of one’s position, which, in turn, calls into
question one’s reputation for consistency, a highly valued asset in our economic culture.
Cognitive-dissonance theory predicts that once a commitment is made, attitudes and
beliefs will shift to preserve consistency.”); see also A. Mechele Dickerson, A
Behavioral Approach to Analyzing Corporate Failures, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 5-6
(2003). The tendency to remain at the status quo is called the status quo bias. Daniel
Kahneman, et. al, Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo
Bias, in CHOICE, VALUES, & FRAMES 159, 163 (Kahneman & Tversky eds., 2000).
166. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note87, at 445; see also LoPucki &
Whitford, supra note 87, at 726 (finding that in large public company reorganizations,
management changed in seventy percent of the cases).
167. LOPUCKI, supra note 65, at 143-45.
168. LOPUCKI, supra note 65, at 145.
169. LOPUCKI, supra note 65, at 145. Because of these behavioral biases and the
evidence that supports their validity, at least one scholar has suggested that directors
should be under a duty to file a timely bankruptcy petition to encourage directors to
consider the interests of all the company’s constituents, including workers, creditors,
the community, and shareholders. See generally Dickerson, supra 165. But most of
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are “vital” to the reorganization may impede reorganization efforts, and
it sacrifices the claims of securities fraud victims.
4. Res Judicata Concerns
One of the most potent arguments directors and officers advance is
that the stay should be extended because the securities fraud litigation
may produce findings that would bind the debtor-company through res
judicata or collateral estoppel.170 Collateral estoppel bars a party from
re-litigating an issue determined against that party in an earlier action.171
Some bankruptcy courts have been receptive to this argument and have
recognized that this concern may warrant extending the automatic
stay.172 Indeed, it does weigh in favor of extending the automatic stay.
However, this is an “unusual” circumstance that is not present in every
securities fraud case. Moreover, it assumes the plaintiffs will sue the
debtor-company. Even still, allowing securities fraud claims to be
determined by the federal district court is consistent with Congress’s
intent that the federal district courts, not the bankruptcy courts, resolve

the efforts aimed at eradicating the overconfidence bias have failed and no clear
solution has yet presented itself that would counteract this bias. Baruch Fischhoff,
Debiasing, in DANIEL KAHNEMAN, ET AL, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS
AND BIASES 432 (1982).
170. See, e.g., In re Uni-Marts, LLC, 404 B.R. 767, 780-81 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009);
In re SN Liquidation, Inc., 388 B.R. 579, 585 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008); In re Am. Film
Tech., Inc., 175 B.R. 847, 850-54 (Bankr. D. Del. 1994).
171. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 279 (8th ed. 2004). The consequences of collateral
estoppel can be dire for both defendants and plaintiffs: “[i]t can be invoked offensively .
. . to preclude litigation of an issue that was decided favorably . . . in a prior action. Or,
it can be used defensively . . . to preclude relitigation of an issue that was decided in his
favor in a prior suit.” JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES &
MATERIALS 1273 (10th ed. 2009).
172. In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 111 B.R. 423, 435 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re
Am. Film Techs., Inc., 175 B.R. at 848; In re Johns Manville Corp., 40 B.R. 219, 225
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“[O]nce a witness has testified to a fact, or what sounds like a fact,
that witness may be confronted with his prior testimony under oath in a future
proceeding directly involving [the debtor], whether or not [the debtor] was a party to the
record on which the initial testimony was taken. Once an admission against interest is
made, under oath or otherwise, by the agent of a party, that admission stands for all
time. No matter what [the plaintiffs] may stipulate, the thousands of other claimants and
cross claimants who [may be] after [the debtor’s] assets, would be entitled to use the
product of such discovery.”).
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these claims.173
C. MAKING NON-DEBTOR SECURITIES FRAUD ACTIONS UNECONOMICAL
Securities fraud actions against non-debtors face another barrier as
a result of the company’s bankruptcy: increased costs. As this Part
shows, a company’s bankruptcy may make securities fraud actions
against non-debtors uneconomical by imposing unnecessary and
duplicative discovery costs on investor plaintiffs.174 Also, it may result
in the denial of class certification outside of the bankruptcy court.175
1. Bankruptcy Materials and Heightened Pleading for Securities Fraud
First, bankruptcy can duplicate discovery efforts for plaintiffinvestors. Securities fraud actions already face considerable procedural
barriers on a motion to dismiss,176 for class certification,177 and for
summary judgment.178 Specifically, under the PSLRA, Congress
173. See infra note 113 and accompanying text (explaining that Congress relegated
securities fraud claims to the federal district court, not bankruptcy courts); see also
supra note 246 and accompanying text (explaining that bankruptcy courts may not have
jurisdiction to determine securities fraud liability in the first instance).
174. See supra Part III.C.1.
175. See supra Part III.C.2.
176. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., interpreted the PSLRA’s scienter
requirement and has required a “mini-trial on the merits” at the 12(b)(6) stage absent
any benefit of discovery. In re ProQuest Sec. Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 728, 747 (E.D.
Mich. 2007). John M. Wunderlich, Amending Pleadings in Securities Fraud Litigation
After Tellabs, 37 No. 4 SEC. REG. L.J. 360 (2009) (discussing the varied approaches to
whether Rule 15’s liberal amendment policy perseveres in light of the PSLRA
and Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.)
177. E.g., Fener v. Operating Eng’rs. Constr. Indus. & Misc. Pension Fund, 579
F.3d 401, 407-410 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that absent an event study that rules out
other causes of a stock price decline, a court will deny class certification to the plaintiff
class); In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 486 (2d Cir. 2008)
(mandating that defendants be given an opportunity to rebut the fraud-on-the-market
presumption at class certification); Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom,
Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 270 (5th Cir. 2007) (requiring plaintiffs to establish loss causation
by a preponderance of the evidence to use the fraud-on-the-market presumption of
reliance at the class certification stage).
178. In re Williams Sec. Litig., 496, F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Okla. 2007) (requiring
a reliable event study to connect post-transaction stock movement to the defendant’s
fraud and holding that absent an event study, a court will grant summary judgment for
the defendant); see also Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Regressing: The
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enhanced the pleading standard, requiring that plaintiffs allege facts
(including the defendant’s state of mind) with particularity.179 Congress
also stayed discovery pending a motion to dismiss.180 This stay of
discovery has forced plaintiffs to resort to other, less conventional
means to meet the heightened requirement.181 Materials prepared in the
context of a company’s bankruptcy—such as the bankruptcy petition,
the bankruptcy docket and pleadings, transcripts from bankruptcy
proceedings, a trustee’s complaint, or a bankruptcy examiner’s report—
may provide a wealth of information for plaintiffs’ attorneys.182
Recognizing this, defendants in related securities fraud actions often
object vigorously to a plaintiffs’ use of this information.183 This Part
Troubling Dispositive Role of Event Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 15 STAN.
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 183, 208-09 (2009) (arguing that an event study is now an essential
element of 10b-5 liability).
179. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) ; see also Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 306 (2d Cir.
2000).
180. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) . Even mandatory disclosures are put on hold until
after the court rules on a motion to dismiss. Medhekar v. U.S. Dist. Court, 99 F.3d 325,
328-29 (9th Cir. 1996); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(C) . The discovery stay has two
exceptions: (1) to preserve evidence; and (2) to prevent undue prejudice. Med.
Imaging Ctrs. of Am., Inc. v. Lichtenstein, 917 F. Supp. 717, 720 (S.D. Cal.1996). An
additional purpose of the discovery stay is that it slows the race to the courthouse door
by forcing plaintiffs to conduct more extensive prefiling investigations. Michael A.
Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
913, 929 (2003).
181. See, e.g., Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Resolving the
Continuing Controversy Regarding Confidential Informants in Private Securities
Litigation, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 637 (2010) (discussing how securities
plaintiffs often rely on confidential informants to satisfy the heightened pleading
burden); Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Congress, the Supreme Court
and the Proper Role of Confidential Informants in Securities Fraud Litigation, 36 No.
2 SEC. REG. L.J. 345, 345-46 (2008) (same); Ethan D. Wohl, Confidential Informants in
Private Litigation: Balancing Interests in Anonymity and Disclosure, XII FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 551, 555 (2007) (same).
182. In re Stratosphere, Corp., Sec. Litig., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1106 n.8 (D. Nev.
1998); see also In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc., Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d 198, 221-22 (3d
Cir. 2002) (transcript from bankruptcy proceedings); Cohen v. Nw. Growth Corp., 385
F. Supp. 2d 935, 965-66 (D.S.D. 2005) (bankruptcy petition); Catholic Order of
Foresters v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1160 (N.D. Iowa
2004) (bankruptcy docket and pleadings). The scope of examination in bankruptcy is
much broader than discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In re
Recoton, Corp., 307 B.R. 751, 755 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).
183. See, e.g., In re New Century Trs. Holdings, Inc., 407 B.R. 558, 562-63 (Bankr.
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shows that bankruptcy materials help plaintiff-investors meet their
pleading and evidentiary burdens, but the courts may impede the use of
these materials.
Certain records in the debtor’s bankruptcy case—like statements
made at bankruptcy hearings or a trustee’s complaint alleging fraud—
prove useful to securities fraud plaintiffs.184 Any party in interest in the
debtor’s bankruptcy may request the appointment of a trustee,185 with
power to avoid transfers, assume executory contracts, retain
professionals, and even operate the debtor’s business.186 The trustee can
also bring claims on behalf of the debtor’s estate.187 In In re Huffy, the
plaintiff-investors brought a securities class action against Huffy
Corporation and its executives for violating the securities laws by
misrepresenting its acquisition of Gen-X, a rival manufacturer of
sporting goods.188 On a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs asked the court
to take judicial notice of the trustee’s complaint filed in Huffy’s
bankruptcy, which alleged that the Huffy executives breached their
fiduciary duty by paying nearly $2.7 million out of Huffy’s retirement
plan to another executive without determining whether Huffy was
solvent.189 This allegation, the plaintiffs maintained, demonstrated the

D. Del. 2009); In re Recoton Corp., 307 B.R. at 754.
184. Cf. Jacobson v. AEG Capital Corp., 50 F.3d 1493, 1496 (9th Cir. 1995); see
Charal Inv. Co., Inc. v. Rockefeller (In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc., Sec. Litig.), 311
F.3d 198, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2002) (counsel’s statements made at bankruptcy hearing);
SEC. v. Antar, 120 F. Supp. 2d 431 (D.N.J. 2000) (deposition testimony).
185. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (“At any time after the commencement of the case but
before confirmation of a plan, on request of a party in interest or the United States
trustee, and after notice and a hearing, the court shall order the appointment of a trustee
. . .”).
186. 11 U.S.C. §§ 544-550; 365; 327; 1108.
187. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir.
1991) (“The Trustee stands in shoes of bankrupt corporation and has standing to bring
any suit that corporation could have instituted had it not petitioned for
bankruptcy.”); see also Smith v. Arthur Anderson, LLP, 421 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005)
(holding that the trustee could assert claims against Chapter 11 debtor’s former officers
and directors, attorneys, auditors, and investment bankers for breach of fiduciary duty,
breach of contract, and professional malpractice).
188. In re Huffy Corp. Sec. Litig., 577 F. Supp. 2d 968, 974 (S.D. Ohio
2008). (plaintiffs claimed that the Gen-X acquisition was a “disaster,” because Gen X’s
costs were not controlled, its inventory was in a state of disarray, its invoices had not
been collected and its bills were unpaid).
189. Id. at 979-80.
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executive’s scienter (or motive) to misrepresent.190 The court took
judicial notice of the trustee’s complaint for two reasons.191 First, the
plaintiffs were only asking the court to take judicial notice of the
allegations, not the truth of it, and on a motion to dismiss, as opposed to
a motion for summary judgment, the court had to address only whether
the allegations in the complaint stated a claim for relief, not whether
sufficient evidence made the case.192 Second, the request for judicial
notice was comparable to asking for leave to amend.193 Further, the
court noted that taking judicial notice of the trustee’s complaint, rather
than dismissing without prejudice and forcing the plaintiffs to file an
amended complaint, would conserve judicial resources.194 Once the
district court considered the trustee’s complaint, the plaintiffs were able
to adequately allege scienter for one of the executives.195
Bankruptcy examiners have played major roles in investigating prepetition misconduct that led to the filing of some of the most notorious
cases of corporate fraud, including Enron and WorldCom.19 6 Under the

190. Id. at 981 (explaining that defendants argued the Court could not take judicial
notice of the Trustee’s complaint, because it contained only allegations and not facts).
191. Id. at 978-79. (“In determining whether to grant a Federal Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, district courts primarily consider the allegations in the complaint. The court is
not limited to the four corners of the complaint, however. Numerous cases . . . have
allowed consideration of matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim,
items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the
record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint whose authenticity is
unquestioned; these items may be considered by the district judge without converting
the motion into one for summary judgment.” (citing 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1357 at 375-76)).
192. In re Huffy Corp. Sec. Litig., 577 F. Supp. 2d at 978 (stating that on a motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court ordinarily cannot consider matters outside of the
pleading unless the court converts the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary
judgment under Rule 56.); See, e.g., Buck v. F.D.I.C., 75 F.3d 1285,1288 n.3 (8th Cir.
1996).
193. In re Huffy Corp. Sec. Litig., 577 F. Supp. 2d at 981 (stating that leave to
amend is freely given and that the PSLRA does not limit this.). But the circuits are
divided over whether Rule 15’s liberal amendment policy remains in tact in light of the
PSLRA and Tellabs. See Wunderlich, Amending Pleadings in Securities Fraud, supra
note 176. If the court takes a stringent view of Rule 15, judicial notice may not have
been appropriate because amendment may not have been proper.
194. In re Huffy Corp. Sec. Litig., 577 F. Supp. 2d at 981-82.
195. Id. at 995.
196. Clifford J. White III & Walter W. Theus, Jr., Chapter 11 Trustees and
Examiners After BAPCPA, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 289, 321 (2006); see also Colin
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Code, the bankruptcy court can (although rarely does197) appoint a
bankruptcy examiner to investigate conduct and then file a report
regarding that investigation.198 An examiner is usually appointed when
the movant alleges securities fraud by the debtor and its management
team.199 If a bankruptcy examiner is charged with investigating any fact
pertaining to fraud or misconduct, his report is highly relevant to
securities law violations.200 The examiner’s report can roadmap future
litigation, but also put the brakes on meritless causes of action.201 If a
Barr, $642 Million To clean up Lehman—and Counting, CNNMONEY.COM, (Mar. 12,
2010), available at, http://money.cnn.com/2010/03/12/news/companies/lehman.fees.
fortune/index.htm.
197. David J. Baldwin & R. Stephen McNeill, Considerations of Examiner
Appointments in Bankruptcy Actions, 26 BANKR. STRATEGIST 1 (June 2009).
198. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104(c); 1106(a)-(b); In re Big Rivers Elec. Corp. v.
Schilling, 355 F.3d 415, 422, 429 (6th Cir. 2004). The examiner’s report, once filed, is
a public record. 11 U.S.C § 107(a) (“. . . a paper filed in a case under this title and the
dockets of a bankruptcy court are public records and open to examination by an entity at
reasonable times without charge . . .”). A bankruptcy court can, however, order the
information sealed for commercial, confidential, or defamatory reasons. In re
Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 156 B.R. 414, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). An examiner may obtain
documents and materials from the debtor-company, its directors, officers, and even its
auditors, to name a few. See, e.g., In re New Century Trs Holdings, Inc., 407 B.R. 558,
562-63 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009). An examiner performs his duties at the request of the
bankruptcy court, for the benefit of the debtor, its creditors, and shareholders. See, e.g.,
id.
199. Baldwin & McNeill, supra note 197, at 1.
200. See Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA
Litig.), No. MDL-1446, 2005 WL 3504860, at *10 n.19 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2005); In re
SemGroup Energy Partners, L.P., Sec. Litig., No. 08-MD-1989-GKF-FJM, 2009 WL
3713524, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 4, 2009). In Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, the
bankruptcy examiner reported that Lehman Brothers’ use of an accounting device, the
“Repo105,” was used only for the purposes of balance sheet manipulation and that there
would likely be a colorable claim against the senior officers that certified and oversaw
the transactions involving this accounting device. Introduction, Executive Summary,
and Procedural Background, Report of Examiner in In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc.,
No. 08-13555 (JMP), at 5-8, 18-21 (Mar. 11, 2010), available at, http://lehmanreport.
jenner.com/VOLUME%201.pdf; see also Final Report of Bankruptcy Examiner, Final
Report of Examiner in In re New Century Trs Holdings, Inc., No. 07-10416 (KJC) (Feb.
29, 2008), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/
Final_Report_New_Century.pdf (concluding that the debtor company engaged in a
number of significant improper and imprudent practices related to its loan originations).
201. White III & Theus, supra note 196, at 323. This point should not be glossed
over. Securities fraud opponents are often concerned that much of securities litigation
is frivolous. This was a driving belief behind enactment of the PSLRA. S. REP. NO.
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securities fraud plaintiff may rely on a bankruptcy examiner’s report, the
plaintiff can save significant time and money otherwise spent in
duplicative discovery.202
Bankruptcy courts are mindful, however, that an examiner’s report
should not “fuel the litigation fires of third party litigants.”20 3 This
concern existed in the massive bankruptcy of Baldwin-United, which
was alleged to have artificially inflated the value of its stock through
misleading financial reports, statements, and press releases.204 BaldwinUnited eventually filed bankruptcy in 1983,205 which was, at the time,
the largest bankruptcy in American history.206 Three days after filing

104-98, at 5 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683 (“The Committee
heard substantial testimony that today certain lawyers file frivolous “strike” suits
alleging violations of the Federal Securities Laws in the hope that defendants will
quickly settle to avoid the expense of litigation.”); H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995)
(Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730 (discussing the “abusive
practices” employed in securities litigation). Thus, allowing a bankruptcy examiner to
screen out frivolous claims would best serve Congress’s intent behind the PSLRA and
inhibit the filing of frivolous suits.
202. In re Baldwin United Corp., 46 B.R. 314,316 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) (“[T]he
Examiner’s file drawers offer a most enticing alternative to the long and bloody battles
which plaintiffs’s counsel often face in the discovery phase of securities
litigation.”); see also Colin Barr, $642 Million To clean up Lehman—and Counting,
CNNMONEY.COM, (Mar. 12, 2010), available at,http://money.cnn.com/2010/03/12/
news/companies/lehman.fees.fortune/index.htm(“. . . the Lehman report cost less than
half as much as the examiner reports for Enron—another large, complicated, high
profile case—and was issued much sooner after Lehman’s bankruptcy filing. That could
help plaintiffs seeking to recover Lehman losses.”).
203. In re Baldwin United Corp., 46 B.R. at 316; In re New Century Trs Holdings,
Inc., 407 B.R. at 566 (citing In Re Baldwin United Corp.); JOHN C. COFFEE, JR.,
GATEKEEPERS:
THE
PROFESSIONS
AND
CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
39
(2006). (stating that a bankruptcy examiner is in fact an advocate who seeks to frame
the case for liability against those who might be induced to contribute to the bankrupt
estate.)
204. Stoller v. Baldwin United, No. C 1 82 1438, 1984 WL 884, at 885 (S.D. Ohio
Sep. 19, 1984).
205.
Lynn M. LoPucki, Bankruptcy Research Database, available at,
http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/companyinfo.asp?name=Baldwin-United+Corporation (last
visited, Sep. 16, 2009).
206. Stoller v. Baldwin-United Corp., 41 B.R. 884, 886 (S.D. Ohio 1984). (“The
balance sheets contemplated nearly ten billion dollars, and the case involved more than
200 subsidiaries of the debtor corporations.”); Baldwin-United Corp. v. Paine Webber
Group, Inc. (In re Baldwin-United Corp.), 57 B.R. 759, 769 (S.D. Ohio. 1985) (“There
were over 8,000 claims filed representing well over 1000,000 peoples and entities.”).
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for bankruptcy, multiple securities fraud suits were brought in various
federal district courts207 but were stayed by Section 362 of the Code.208
The bankruptcy court appointed an examiner to identify any fraud,
dishonesty, or mismanagement in the affairs of the debtor-company.209
The securities fraud plaintiffs moved to lift the stay to pursue their
securities litigation, arguing that if they could not continue, they would
lose valuable evidence.210 The district court denied the request even
though the plaintiffs would have benefitted from the examiner’s
report.211 In the bankruptcy court, the securities fraud plaintiffs then
moved for an order requiring the court-appointed examiner to preserve
documents and other investigative materials.212 The bankruptcy court,
however, was wary that if examiners become “civil grand juries”
(thereby losing their nonadversarial role), the subjects of their
investigation would be hampered by the threat of litigation.213
Similarly, in the Enron debacle, the securities fraud plaintiffs
incorporated the entire bankruptcy examiner’s report in their
complaint.21 4 The district court found that the plaintiffs’ incorporation
207. See In re Baldwin-United Corp. Litig., 765 F.2d at 344; In re Baldwin-United
Corp., 57 B.R. at 762.
208. 11 U.S.C. § 362.
209. In re Baldwin United Corp., 46 B.R. 314 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985).
210. Stoller, 41 B.R. at 884, 890. The bankruptcy court is not the only forum that
determines third party discovery issues relating to the examiner. See In re Baldwin
United Corp., 46 B.R. at 317.
211. Stoller, 41 B.R. at 891 (“As to the potential for fading memory or misplaced
records, the impact of that concern is blunted by the fact that the bankruptcy examiner
will be conducting an investigation into whether fraud occurred in the recent corporate
past of the debtors. As already noted, the bankruptcy court, in denying these plaintiffs’
motion for relief from the § 362 stay, concluded that ‘[w]hile the scope of [the
examiner’s] investigation may not precisely coincide with the thrust of the . . .
plaintiffs’ discovery, it would appear totally senseless for the plaintiffs to proceed with
their monumental task until they have the benefit of [the examiner’s] efforts.’”).
212. In re Baldwin United Corp., 46 B.R. at 314. The Bankruptcy court was
concerned that the prospect of litigation surrounding the examiner’s investigation would
chill compliance with the examiner’s efforts. Id. at 316. To assuage these concerns, the
plaintiffs cleverly argued that they sought only the preservation of the evidence and not
the use of it. Id. The bankruptcy court was unimpressed and stated that there was “little
doubt that they will at some point seek to require the Examiner to turn over some or all
of the documents and other information which he has obtained through his
investigation.” Id.
213. Id. at 317.
214. Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig.),
No. MDL-1446, 2005 WL 3504860, at *11 n.20 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2005).
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of the report was proper and as a result, the plaintiffs were able to
overcome a motion to dismiss.215 Relying on an examiner’s report to
muster a securities fraud claim does present some risk, however.
LoPucki aptly describes this danger within the context of Enron, where
the plaintiffs incorporated the entire examiner’s report in their
complaint216:
Enron and the other parties who wished to sue on Enron’s behalf had
only two years in which to file their cases or be barred by the statute
of limitations. Because the case was handled so awkwardly, nearly
six months passed before the examiner was even appointed. The
effect was to rush the investigation. The examiner worked quickly
but was still completing his report when the deadline expired. That
left parties who discovered their causes of action through the
examiner’s work little or no time in which to digest the 4,500-page
report, retain counsel, and prepare their lawsuits for filing.21 7

If the bankruptcy case is handled poorly, securities fraud plaintiffs
may not be able to wait for the examiner’s report. Additionally,
LoPucki warns that the bankruptcy examiner may—as in the case of
Enron—work against class action plaintiffs and destroy documents that
these investors seek because, for one reason or another, the examiner
promised confidentiality to the sources.21 8
215. Id. at *11, 13-14. The court supported its conclusion by referring to Rule
10(c) which allows a party to incorporate any instrument as an exhibit to a pleading.
Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c) (“A statement in a pleading may be adopted by
reference elsewhere in the same pleading or in any other pleading or motion. A copy of
a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all
purposes.”).
216. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 2005 WL 3504860, at *11
n.20.
217. LOPUCKI, supra note 65, at 151.
218. Id. at 148; cf. Colin Barr, $642 Million To Clean Up Lehman—and Counting,
CNNMONEY.COM,
(Mar.
12,
2010), available
at,
http://money.cnn.com/2010/03/12/news/companies/lehman.fees.fortune/index.htm (“At
the same time, the Lehman report cost less than half as much as the examiner reports for
Enron—another large, complicated, high profile case—and was issued much sooner
after Lehman’s bankruptcy filing. That could help plaintiffs seeking to recover Lehman
losses. ’The Lehman case is much like the Enron case. . . People were waiting for the
examiner report in the Enron case, and it ended up serving as the basis for lots of civil
suits.’ The promptness of the [examiner’s report in Lehman’s bankruptcy] will give the
many aggrieved parties in the Lehman case ample time to pursue claims against the
company’s officers, business partners and others . . . The statute of limitations for
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Moreover, the bankruptcy courts may place limits on the use of
bankruptcy materials in securities fraud litigation.219 For example, in In
re Recoton, the committee of unsecured creditors moved the bankruptcy
court to authorize subpoenas for the production of documents and to
examine witnesses.220 The directors of the debtor-company (the persons
from whom discovery was sought) objected because securities fraud
suits were pending against them in federal district court.221 The
directors argued that an examination in bankruptcy would deny them the
benefit of the PSLRA’s stay of discovery provision.222 The district court
rejected the defendants’ PSLRA argument, however because the PSLRA
only applies to suits that have in fact begun and provides for a
mandatory stay of discovery in actions brought only under the federal
securities laws.223 Thus, the district court ordered the examination under
Bankruptcy Rule 2004,224 stating:
The investigation that a debtor or creditors committee may . . . be an
essential element in the formulation of a Chapter 11 plan or in a
Chapter 7 trustee’s ability to make any distribution to creditors. It
would seriously delay and disrupt the administration of bankruptcy
cases if the happenstance of a pending securities action gave the
defendants in that suit the ability to impede investigations that the
claims filed by a bankruptcy trustee is two years, which means many Lehman cases will
have to be filed in the next six months.”).
219. See In re Recoton, Corp., 307 B.R. 751, 759 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).
220. Id. at 754. The committee is expressly authorized to investigate the acts,
conduct, assets, liabilities and financial condition of the debtor under § 1103 of the
Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2) (stating that a committee appointed under
Section 1102 may “investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial
condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor’s business and the desirability of the
continuance of such business, and any other matter relevant to the case or to the
formulation of a plan.”).
221. In re Recoton, Corp., 307 B.R. at 755.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 757-58.
224. The relevant portions of Bankruptcy Rule 2004 states:
(a) Examination on motion.
On motion of any party in interest, the court may order the examination of any
entity.
(b) Scope of examination.
The examination of an entity . . . may relate only to the acts, conduct, or property
or to the liabilities and financial condition of the debtor, or to any matter which
may affect the administration of the debtor’s estate, or to the debtor’s right to a
discharge. . . .

FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004(a)-(b).
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debtor or committee may appropriately conduct . . .225

Yet, the court only permitted the examination because the court
received assurances from the committee that any discovery would be
subject to a protective order “prohibiting its use for any purpose
whatsoever other than in connection with this bankruptcy proceeding
and prohibiting its disclosure . . . to the plaintiffs in the [securities class
action].”22 6
Prohibiting the use of discovered material relevant to fraud
unjustifiably duplicates discovery costs for plaintiffs.
Allowing
plaintiffs access to materials can simplify suits, decrease costs for both
parties, and most important, expose corporate fraud.
2. Denying Class Certification in
Non-Debtor Actions in Non-Debtor Forums
A company’s bankruptcy may even influence a district court’s
decision to certify a securities class action against a non-debtor. In
Gregory v. Finova Capital, the high-water mark for bankruptcy’s
protection of non-debtors from securities fraud, the Fourth Circuit held
that the district court abused its discretion when it certified a class action
against a non-debtor.
In Gregory, noteholders of the Thaxton Group, Inc. (“TGI”) filed a
class action against TGI’s lender, Finova Capital Corporation
(“Finova”).227 TGI sold the notes in a series of person-to-person
transactions and under eight separate registration statements filed with
the SEC.228 According to the plaintiffs, Finova worked with TGI to put
together a group of companies that were insolvent by about $40 million
and that TGI was doomed to fail from its inception.229 TGI, which was
started by Finova, had no net profits, and could only stay in business by
raising money from a larger and larger group of investors, similar to a
Ponzi scheme.230 The day after the plaintiffs filed suit against Finova,
225. In re Recoton, Corp., 307 B.R. at 759.
226. Id. at 756; see also In re Mittco, Inc., 44 B.R. 35, 35 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1984)
(limiting Rule 2004 discovery when it is designed to abuse or harass).
227. Gregory v. Finova Capital Corp., 442 F.3d 188, 189 (4th Cir. 2006).
228. Id.
229. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 4, Gregory v. Finova Capital Corp., 442 F.3d
188 (4th Cir. 2006) (No. 05-2118).
230. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 6, Gregory v. Finova Capital Corp., 442 F.3d
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TGI filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.231 The noteholders alleged that
TGI misrepresented financial data in the notes’ registration
statements.232 They also alleged that Finova was jointly and severally
liable for the misrepresentations as a controlling person under Section 15
of the 1933 Act,233 which provides for joint and several liability on
behalf of controlling persons.234 The noteholders sought to certify a
class action against Finova in federal district court.235
Meanwhile, after the noteholders filed their class action, the
committee of TGI’s unsecured creditors brought an adversary
proceeding against Finova, in TGI’s bankruptcy, to either disallow or
subordinate Finova’s claims to the noteholders’ claims because Finova
violated the securities laws.23 6 After these events in the bankruptcy
court, the district court certified the noteholders as a class.237
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s class certification
decision, finding that the district court abused its discretion by certifying
188 (4th Cir. 2006) (No. 05-2118). A “Ponzi scheme,” or “pyramid scheme,” is a
fraudulent investment scheme in which money contributed by investors is used directly
to repay or pay interest to earlier investors. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
231. Gregory, 442 F.3d at 189.
232. The Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (“In case any part of the
registration statement, when such part became effective, contained an untrue statement
of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, any person acquiring such
security (unless it is proved that at the time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth
or omission) may ...sue... every person who signed the registration statement...”).
233. Gregory, 442 F.3d at 189. Section 15 of the 1933 Act and Section 20(a) of the
1934 Act both impose liability on controlling persons, but they differ slightly in
language. Section 15 appears to provide a complete defense for ignorance while
Section 20(a) requires a showing of good faith. COFFEE, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION,
supra note 63, at 1078-79. Courts are still wrestling with what this difference in
language means though.
234. The Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o. According to the plaintiffs,
Finova was an active partner and counselor to TGI, took a leading role in most of TGI’s
major business decisions, and was fully aware of the note-sale program designed to
transfer the risky portion of Finova debt to the unsuspecting noteholders. Gregory, 442
F.3d at 189.
235. Gregory, 442 F.3d at 189.
236. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 510(c).
237. Gregory, 442 F.3d at 190. To certify a class, a plaintiff must satisfy the
numerosity, commonality, adequacy, and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a). FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(a). In addition, for actions certified under Rule 23(b)(3) seeking monetary
damages, the class issues must predominate over individual issues and the class action
device must be a superior method of adjudication. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(B).
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the class. It reasoned that the district court failed to analyze whether the
class action was superior to the adversary proceeding pending in the
bankruptcy court to adjudicate the noteholders’ claims.238 The court
reasoned that it would be “inefficient and needlessly duplicative” and
that the adversary proceeding would make the same findings regarding
Finova’s conduct.239 Additionally, the court observed that if the
noteholders were made more or less whole by success in the adversary
proceeding—success would result in payment from TGI’s assets ahead
of Finova — Finova’s direct liability to the noteholders would be more
or less extinguished.240
Gregory wrongly reversed the district court, however. First, the
Fourth Circuit ignored the highly deferential standard governing the
review of a district court’s decision to certify a class action.24 1 Here,
there was no abuse of the district court’s discretion when it certified a
securities class action consisting of noteholders of the debtor proceeding
against a lender of the debtor (non-debtor vs. non-debtor) over the
objection of—not the debtor—but creditors of the debtor (non-debtor vs.
non-debtor, with non-debtors objecting).
Second, the adversary
bankruptcy proceeding concerned only whether Finova must wait behind
the noteholders in line for TGI’s assets, and it would not resolve whether
238. Gregory, 442 F.3d at 190-91. A district court’s decision to certify a class is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Lienhart v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 255 F.3d 138 (4th
Cir. 2001); McClain v. S.C. Nat’l Bank, 105 F.3d 898, 902 (4th Cir. 1997).
239. Gregory, 442 F.3d at 191 n.5.
240. Id.; see the Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (providing for joint
and several liability for violations of Section 11 of the 1933 Act).
241. The abuse of discretion standard requires a reviewing court to show enough
deference to a decision maker’s judgment that the court does not reverse merely
because it would have come to a different result in the first instance. See Henry J.
Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J.747, 754 (1982) (“[T]he trial
judge has discretion in those cases where his ruling will not be reversed simply because
an appellate court disagrees.”); see also Monroe v. City of Charlotesville, Va., 579 F.3d
380, 384 (4th Cir. 2009) (stating that a decision to deny or grant class certification is
accorded “great” deference); Brown v. Nucor Corp., 576 F.3d 149, 161 (4th Cir. 2009)
(noting that an appellate court reviews a decision to certify a class under the “highly
deferential” abuse of discretion standard); In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d
1, 4 (1st Cir. 2005) (same). What’s more, when reviewing a grant of class certification,
as in Gregory, appellate courts accord the district court noticeably more deference than
when reviewing a denial of class certification. E.g., In re Flag Telecom Holdings, Ltd.
Sec. Litig., 574 F.3d 29, 34 (2d Cir. 2009); In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig.,
544 F.3d 474, 480 (2d Cir. 2008); Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 375 (2d Cir.
1997).
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Finova was directly liable to the noteholders.242
Whether the
noteholders’ direct claims against Finova will be extinguished by the
adversary bankruptcy proceeding was speculative because: (1) it was
uncertain whether the creditors committee would prevail; and (2) even if
they did prevail, the Code provides only that the bankruptcy court
“may,” and not “must,” equitably subordinate the claims.243 Further, the
plaintiffs were not even parties to the adversary proceeding in
bankruptcy.244
Third, a bankruptcy court may lack authority to determine securities
fraud liability in the first instance.24 5 The bankruptcy courts disagree
over whether they have the authority to determine liability between the
debtor-company and the securities fraud claimant.246 If this authority is
questionable (debtor vs. non-debtor), then a bankruptcy court’s authority
to determine liability for securities fraud between a securities fraud
claimant and a non-debtor (non-debtor vs. non-debtor), is even less
242. Gregory, 442 F.3d at 194-95 (King, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 194 n.3.
244 Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 60, Gregory v. Finova Capital Corp., 442 F.3d 188
(4th Cir. 2006) (No. 05-2118).
245. In this case, it would also be questionable whether the bankruptcy court had
subject matter jurisdiction as well. Bankruptcy courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction. E.g., In re Querner, 7 F.3d 1199, 1201 (5th Cir. 1993); In re Granger
Garage, Inc., 921 F.2d 74, 77 (6th Cir. 1990). Bankruptcy courts have only derivative
jurisdiction; “They do not operate under an exclusive grant of jurisdiction as in §
1471(c) but rather derive their jurisdiction from the district courts.” White Motor Corp.
v. Citibank, N.A., 704 F.2d 254, 263 (6th Cir.1983). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1334, a district
court has exclusive jurisdiction of all bankruptcy cases under title 11 and “original but
not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or
related to cases under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b); see also id. § 157(b) (authorizing
district courts to refer “core” and “related to” proceedings to bankruptcy courts for
adjudication). Jurisdiction over proceedings between third parties which have an effect
on the bankruptcy estate flow from the court’s “related to” jurisdiction. Id. § 1334(b).
It is a considerable stretch that this non-debtor action against other non-debtors, to
which only non-debtors are objecting, is related to the bankruptcy estate, particularly
when recovery would not involve any of the debtor’s interests.
246. Compare In re Jafari, 401 B.R. 494, 495 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2009) (stating a
bankruptcy court lacks authority under Section 523(a)(19) to adjudicate liability as
opposed to dischargeability); cf In re Zimmerman, 341 B.R. 77, 80 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
2006); In re Demers, No. 08 00616 FLK7, 2009 WL 3681675, at *1 (Bankr. E.D.
Wash. Oct. 30, 2009) (concluding that bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to determine
liability under Section 523(a)(19)); with In re Chan, 355 B.R. 494, 501 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
2006) (concluding a bankruptcy court has authority to determine both liability and
dischargeability); see also In re Litchman, 388 B.R. 396, 409 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008).
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clear.247 As discussed, not all courts are receptive to class proofs of
claim.248 Judge King observed the practical problem this would present
in Gregory: each TGI noteholder—approximately 4,000 of them—
would have to file a separate lawsuit to preserve his claim against
Finova.249 The burden of bringing multiple, individual adversary
proceedings or a single proceeding with multiple parties would be
enormous.250 Last, Gregory encourages gamesmanship and increases
litigation costs. In the district court, Finova argued that the bankruptcy
court was the proper forum, but in the bankruptcy court, Finova argued
that the district court should resolve the case.251 Finova—the party that
engineered TGI’s bankruptcy to begin with—argued it both ways and
won.

247. See In re Refco Inc., 505 F.3d 109, 118 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Bankruptcy court is a
forum where creditors and debtors can settle their disputes with each other. Any internal
dispute between a creditor and that creditor’s investors belongs elsewhere.”).
248. In re Standard Metals Corp., 817 F.2d at 632 (denying class proof of claim);
In re Amdura Corp., 130 B.R. 575 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991) (same); In re Texaco Inc., 81
B.R. 820 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (same).
249. Gregory, 442 F.3d at 194. For example, in Drexel Burnham’s bankruptcy,
“the magnitude and complexity of 850 securities-related proofs of claim, which totaled
more than $20 billion, was viewed as an almost impossible bar to achieving a
reorganization. The barrier was overcome by the creation of a no-opt-out class, whose
representatives negotiated a settlement with the Drexel debtors.” Leonard H. Gerson,
Another Look at Treatment and Use of Class Proofs of Claim and Class Actions in
Bankruptcy, 27 AM. BANKR. INST. L.J. 16 (2008).
250. Consider Drexel Burnham’s case—the debtor would have to bring 850
individual adversary proceedings or file one adversary proceeding with 850 parties.
This places considerable strain on the debtor-company, the other parties, and the
judicial system. This burden can be reduced by bringing a single adversary proceeding
and a single class proof of claim. Gerson, supra note 249, at 16.
251. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 58-59, Gregory v. Finova Capital Corp., 442
F.3d 188 (4th Cir. 2006) (No. 05-2118).
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D. THE PLAN OF REORGANIZATION: JURISDICTION AND POWER TO
RELEASE NON-DEBTOR’S FROM SECURITIES FRAUD LIABILITY252
The courts have not been nearly as subtle as the previous Parts
suggest in releasing non-debtors from liability in bankruptcy. Courts
outright release non-debtors in the debtor’s plan of reorganization. In
exchange for surrendering all assets over to the bankruptcy court’s
jurisdiction, the debtor receives a discharge from pre-petition debt, quid
pro quo.25 3 This discharge benefits only the debtor; it does not apply to
guarantors, co-defendants, employees, or related companies—and
therefore, creditors are free to collect from these co-liable parties.254
Nevertheless, bankruptcy courts have used their general, equitable
powers under the Code to extinguish claims against non-debtors.25 5
Recently, in Travelers Indemnity v. Bailey, the Supreme Court held that
bankruptcy courts have subject matter jurisdiction to discharge claims
against non-debtors in the debtor’s plan of reorganization if the claims256
252. David A. Skeel, Jr., suggests that trial lawyers have been supportive, rather
than critical, of bankruptcy’s role in mass tort resolution and that this support reflects
the comparative attractions of bankruptcy as opposed to bringing class action litigation
outside of bankruptcy. SKEEL, JR., supra note 9, at 220. This may be especially true for
securities litigation, where, in recent years, the federal courts have made the standards
for class certification more rigorous. See generally Michael J. Kaufman & John M.
Wunderlich, The Unjustified Judicial Creation of Class Certification Merits Trials in
Securities Fraud Actions, 43 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 323 (2010).
253. E.g., In re Mosby, 244 B.R. 79, 85 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000) (quoting In re
Jeffrey, 176 B.R. 4, 6 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994)) (“A chapter 7 case involves a quid pro
quo: debtors receive a discharge and, in exchange, make full disclosure about their
financial affairs, especially their assets, and surrender their nonexempt assets to the
trustee for liquidation and distribution among creditors. . . . Having received a
discharge, they cannot now ignore their obligation to surrender their assets for the
benefit of creditors.”); In re O’Shaughnessy, 252 B.R. 722, 735 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000)
(“Complete and full disclosure is the quid pro quo for the substantial benefits obtained
by the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) which is subsumed by the discharge
provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1141 in a Chapter 11 case.”).
254. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (applying only to the debtor).
255. Joshua M. Silverstein, Hiding in Plain View: A Neglected Supreme Court
Decision Resolves the Debate Over Non-Debtor Releases in Chapter 11
Reorganizations, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 13, 16-17 (2006). “For at least eighteen
years, the federal courts have been divided over whether such releases are permissible.”
Id. at 17.
256. “[T]he expanded definition of claim (together with the Code’s elimination of
any requirement that a debtor be insolvent when it files for bankruptcy) has played a
crucial role in some of the most visible bankruptcy cases of the past two decades, the
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relate to the property of the bankruptcy estate.257 Travelers, though,
leaves much to be desired, as it does not address whether bankruptcy
courts have the power—as opposed to jurisdiction258—to release these
non-debtors. To determine whether a bankruptcy court has the power to
discharge non-debtor liabilities in a plan of reorganization, the majority
of the circuits adopt a flexible approach, assessing the propriety of the
injunction and release of a non-debtor on a case by case basis.259
‘mass tort cases—bankruptcies filed by Johns Manville, A.H. Robins, Dow Corning,
and other firms after they were sued by thousands of actual and potential tort victims.”
SKEEL, JR., supra note 9, at 217.
257. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 129 S. Ct. 2195 (2009). Professor Joshua M.
Silverstein argues that a much earlier decision, United States v. Energy Resources, Co.,
495 U.S. 545 (1990), resolved the debate and concludes that bankruptcy courts have the
power to issue non-debtor releases, but only in narrow circumstances.
Silverstein, supra note 255, at 19-20. This decision was not relied on in Travelers.
See 129 S. Ct. 2195.
258. “Subject matter jurisdiction and power are separate prerequisites to the court’s
capacity to act. Subject matter jurisdiction is the court’s authority to entertain an action
between the parties before it. Power under section 105 is the scope and forms of relief
the court may order in an action in which it has jurisdiction.” Am. Hardwoods, Inc. v.
Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1989).
Jurisdiction over proceedings between third parties which have an effect on the
bankruptcy estate flow from the court’s “related to” jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §
1334(b) (“Except as provided in subsection (e)(2), and notwithstanding any Act of
Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district
courts, the district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil
proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.”).
259. See, e.g., SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham
Lambert Group, Inc.), 960 F.2d 285, 293 (2d Cir. 1992); Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In
re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 702 (4th Cir. 1989); Feld v. Zale Corp. (In re Zale
Corp.), 62 F.3d 746, 760-61 (5th Cir. 1995); In re Munford Inc., 97 F.3d 449, 455 (11th
Cir. 1996); In re AOV Indus., Inc., 792 F.2d 1140, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1986). ”[N]ondebtor releases are receiving ’growing judicial acceptance’ and becoming increasingly
common in Chapter 11 plans of reorganization. Indeed, one commentator has
suggested that ’the practice of approving non-debtor releases is more widespread than
the number of published judicial opinions would suggest[,]’because appellate
challenges to plan reorganization are often mooted by consummation of the plan.”
Silverstein, supra note 255, at 18 (citing Ralph Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions and
Complex Litigation: A Critical Reappraisal of Non-Debtor Releases in Chapter 11
Reorganizations, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 959, 964 n.15 (1997)). Professor Silverstein
notes that the debate is split four ways, rather than two: one group of pro-release courts
that assert the equitable powers of the Code allow for non-debtor releases; a group of
anti-release courts that assert that non-debtor releases violate Section 524; a second
group of anti-release courts that contend that Section 524 does not prohibit non-debtor
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Considerations analyzed by these courts include: (1) whether the case
involves a mass tort claim;260 (2) whether the claim is direct rather than
derivative;261 (3) whether there was a consensual release;262 (4) whether
the claimants were in some way compensated for the release under the
plan;263 (5) whether the release is integral for the debtor to settle with
other creditors;264 and (6) whether the plan contains a channeling
injunction.265 The courts that have adopted this flexible approach—the
infamous mass tort bankruptcies: In re A.H. Robins (intrauterine Dalkon
Shield device), In re Johns-Manville (asbestos), In re Drexel Burnham
(securities fraud), In re Dow Corning (silicone breast implants)—were
all bankruptcies that involved thousands of actual and potential tort
victims266 similar to securities class actions.
Even still, a few circuits are reluctant to extend the release to non-

releases, but the bankruptcy policies underlying it do; and another group of anti-release
courts that argue that Section 524 does not constitute a bar, but the equitable provisions
in the Code simply do not grant enough power to release non-debtors. Id. at 17.
Because non-debtor releases are not the main focus of this article, I will generalize and
discuss two approaches: the pro-release courts, and the anti-release courts.
260. In re Digital Impact, Inc., 223 B.R. 1, 9 (N.D. Okla. 1998); see also In re A.H.
Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742, 743-45 (E.D. Va. 1988) (observing that thousands of tort
actions forced A.H. Robins into bankruptcy); Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In
re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 640, 649 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting that thousands
of asbestos actions pushed Johns Manville into bankruptcy); In re Drexel Burnham
Lambert Group, Inc., 130 B.R. 910, 918-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting that the
bankruptcy involved tens of thousands of securities fraud claimants).
261. In re Zenith Elec. Corp., 241 B.R. 92, 111 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999); In
re Arrowmill Dev. Corp., 211 B.R. 497, 506 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1997).
262. See In re Specialty Equip. Co., 3 F.3d 1043, 1049 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that
consensual agreement is relevant). Consensual non-debtor releases are generally
permissible under the Code because they do not primarily involve the bankruptcy
court’s power. See In re Arrowmill Dev. Corp., 211 B.R. at 506. Rather, the validity of
a consensual release is a question of contract law and courts recognize that they are no
different from any other settlement or contract. See id..
263. In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d at 293; In re AOV
Indus., Inc., 792 F.2d at 1154.
264. In re Munford Inc., 97 F.3d 449, 455 (11th Cir. 1996).
265. Feld v. Zale Corp. (In re Zale Corp.), 62 F.3d 746, 760 (5th Cir. 1995). A
channeling injunction is a provision in the debtor’s plan of reorganization that enables a
court to enjoin all future suits against the debtor or its insurer. Susan N.K. Gummow &
John M. Wunderlich, Suing the Debtor: Examining Post-Discharge Suits Against the
Debtor, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 495, 525-26 (2009). Instead, these suits are “channeled” to
certain proceeds already set aside. Id.
266. SKEEL, JR., supra note 9, at 217.
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debtors.267 This minority concludes that the debtor-company cannot, as
part of its plan of reorganization, release non-debtors, such as the
directors or officers, from shareholders’ claims.268 These courts strike
these provisions on their own, even if the plaintiffs do not object.269
Consider In re Continental Airlines, in which the plaintiffs brought
securities fraud class actions against Continental’s directors and officers,
alleging that they violated the securities laws.270 After these suits were
filed, Continental filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11.271 The
bankruptcy court stayed the plaintiffs’ class action against the directors
and officers and Continental later filed its plan of reorganization, which
released and enjoined the plaintiff-investors’ class action against
Continental’s directors and officers, who themselves were not in
bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court approved the plan over the plaintiffs’
objections.272
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, stating that the Code
explicitly authorizes the release and permanent injunction of claims
against non-debtors in only one instance: resolving asbestos claims.27 3
Other than that, the court stated, the Code clarifies that a discharge does
not relieve non-debtors of their liabilities.274 Even though Section
105(a) grants the bankruptcy courts power to issue any necessary order
to carry out the Code, the court continued, Section 105 is limited in

267. See, e.g., In re Chateaugay Corp., 167 B.R. 776, 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); In
re Mkt. Square Inn, Inc., 163 B.R. 64, 66-67 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1994).
268. See Gillman v. Cont’l Airlines (In re Cont’l Airlines), 203 F.3d 203, 205 (3d
Cir. 2000); Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 1426, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The bankruptcy
court has no power to discharge the liabilities of a nondebtor pursuant to the consent of
creditors as part of a reorganization plan.”); Landsing Diversified Properties-II v. First
Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Tulsa (In re W. Real Estate Fund, Inc.), 922 F.2d 592, 601
(10th Cir. 1990); see also In re Original IFPC S’holders, Inc., 317 B.R. 738, 746-48
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004); In re Arrowmill Dev. Corp., 211 B.R. at 500, 504-06; In re
Future Energy Corp., 83 B.R. 470, 485-86 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988).
269. See In re Davis Broad., Inc., 176 B.R. 290, 292 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
270. In re Cont’l Airlines, 203 F.3d at 205.
271. Id. The plaintiffs did not name the debtor-company in their securities fraud
class action suits, but they did file a class proof of claim in the debtor’s bankruptcy. Id.
at 205 n.1.
272. Id. at 206-07. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s approval of
the plan. Id. at 208.
273. Id. at 211; 11 U.S.C. § 524(g).
274. In re Cont’l Airlines, 203 F.3d at 211.
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scope and cannot create rights that are otherwise unavailable.275 The
Third Circuit then held that the blanket release and injunction was not
permissible, even under the most liberal read of Section 105.276
Whether a bankruptcy court can enjoin future actions against nondebtors in a plan of reorganization presents a recurring question of
jurisdiction and bankruptcy court power. The Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Travelers Indemnity Company v. Bailey involved a state law
claim for fraud against the debtor’s insurer. The case sheds some light
on when a bankruptcy court has jurisdiction (though not power) to
enjoin other actions (such as securities actions) against non-debtors (like
an officer or director).27 7 In Travelers, the bankruptcy court approved
settlement agreements that provided that when the settling (non-debtor)
insurer paid funds to a designated trust, all persons would be
permanently enjoined from bringing or continuing any suit against the
(non-debtor) insurer.278 Ten years later, the plaintiffs brought suit
against the insurer for fraud, and the bankruptcy court enjoined the
action.279
The Supreme Court concluded that the bankruptcy court had
subject-matter jurisdiction to interpret and enforce its own prior order so
long as it dealt with the property of the estate.28 0 Thus, Travelers
275. Id. “One of the most commonly employed canons is expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, which dictates that the express inclusion of one thing signals the
exclusion of all other things. This rule is one individuals use all of the time in everyday
life, just without such formal articulation. In the ‘no dogs in the park’ example, the
commonsense logic of the expressio unius canon is what leads the average person to the
conclusion that ‘no dogs’ does not apply to cats.” Note, Textualism as Fair Notice, 123
HARV. L. REV. 542, 559 (2009).
276. In re Cont’l Airlines, 203 F.3d at 214; see also Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d
1426, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985) (overturning bankruptcy court’s approval of plan of
reorganization that released directors and officers from liability for securities law
violations).
277. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 129 S. Ct. 2195 (2009).
278. Id. at 2199-2200.
279. Id. at 2200.
280. Id. at 2205; see also Ophir v. City of Boston, 647 F. Supp. 2d 86, 91 (D. Mass.
Aug. 14, 2009) (“[I]n the context of the enforceability of a Bankruptcy Court order
releasing an insurer from any claims “based upon, arising out of or relating to” certain
insurance policies, the Supreme Court broadly interpreted the phrase ‘relating to.’”);
Cano v. GMAC Mortg Corp. (In re Cano), 410 B.R. 506, 546 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009)
(“In Travelers Indemnity, the Supreme Court held that, post-discharge, a bankruptcy
court has jurisdiction to interpret and enforce its own orders even though the bankruptcy
case was closed and the claims would not affect the bankruptcy estate.”). However the
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suggests that a bankruptcy court may entertain the prospect of enjoining
suits against non-debtor directors and officers on the presence of D&O
insurance alone. The connection between directors and officers, the
bankruptcy estate, and D&O insurance is much closer than the
attenuated relationship in Travelers, which involved state law claims for
fraud against the insurer that happened to insure the debtor.
Much of Travelers, however, was devoted to cabining the decision.
The Court stated that the holding was narrow and did not resolve
whether a bankruptcy court has the power to enjoin claims against nondebtors that are not derivative of the debtor’s wrongdoing.281 The
Court’s suggestion that the bankruptcy court could enjoin these claims
had explicit textual support in the Code, as Section 524(g)(4)(A) deals
specifically with asbestos claims.282 Moreover, the dissenting justices
argued that bankruptcy courts have the power to enjoin claims against
non-debtors only if the non-debtors seek recovery from the bankruptcy
estate.283
What is most troubling about a non-debtor release—in effect, a
non-debtor discharge—is that it is broader than the discharge these nondebtors would be afforded under the Code. Certain liabilities under the
Code are non-dischargeable.28 4 Debts obtained by false pretenses, false
representation, or actual fraud (other than a statement respecting the

Supreme Court did note that at some point the term “relate to” loses any meaning
because “everything is related to everything else.” Travelers Indem. Co., 129 S. Ct. at
2203-04 (quoting Cal. Div. of Labor Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316,
335 (1997)).
281. Travelers Indem. Co. 129 S. Ct. at 2207.
282. Id. at 2207; see also 11 U.S.C. § 524(g).
283. Travelers Indem. Co., 129 S. Ct. at 2207-08, 2210 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“A
bankruptcy court has no authority . . . to adjudicate, settle, or enjoin claims against
nondebtors that do not affect the debtor’s estate.”).
284. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a). To except a debt from discharge, the claimant must file a
discharge complaint in the debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007.
Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c) provides as a general rule that a complaint to determine the
dischargeability of a debt under section 523(c) must be filed no later than 60 days after
the first date set for the meeting of creditors. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c). Section
523(a)(19) however is governed by Rule 4007(b). FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(b). Rule
4007(b) contains no limit for complaints filed under Section 523(a)(19). FED. R.
BANKR. P. 4007(b). The heightened pleading provisions applicable to securities fraud
claims also apply to motions to except a debt from discharge if it is based on securities
fraud. Guerriero v. Kilroy (In re Kilroy), 354 B.R. 476, 488-89 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
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debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition) are nondischargeable.285
Section 523(a)(19) of the Code also states that any debt for the violation
of any federal or state securities law, or common-law fraud in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security is nondischargeable.286
Granting non-debtors releases for claims that they themselves could not
obtain by filing for bankruptcy is inconsistent with the Code.287

285. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). To except from discharge a debt under Section
523(a)(2)(A), the creditor must show justifiable reliance. Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59,
68, 74-75 (1995). Securities fraud plaintiffs can either present direct evidence of their
actual reliance or they can invoke a presumption of reliance. In Stoneridge Investment
Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, the Supreme Court noted that a rebuttable presumption of
reliance exists in two instances: (1) if there is an omission of a material fact by one with
a duty to disclose; and (2) if the statement at issue becomes public, thereby falling
under the fraud-on-the-market presumption. Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. ScientificAtlanta, Inc. 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 (2008) (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
406 U.S. 128 (1972) (presuming fraud where there is an omission and a duty to
disclose) and Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (presuming fraud under the
fraud-on-the-market presumption)). The bankruptcy courts have not yet addressed
whether a securities fraud plaintiff can invoke one of the reliance presumptions in a
Section 523(a)(2)(A) discharge complaint, but if the basis of securities fraud liability is
“controlling person” liability, then the Code’s discharge exception under Section
523(a)(2)(A) does not apply. Hoffend v. Villa (In re Villa), 261 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th
Cir. 2001); Owen v. Miller (In re Miller), 276 F.3d 424, 429 (8th Cir. 2002).
286. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19). For a debt to be nondischargeable under Section
523(a)(19): (1) the debt must be for a violation of federal or state securities laws, or
common-law fraud, in connection with the purchase or sale of a security; and (2) the
debt results from a judgment, order, decree, or settlement. Frost v. Civiello (In re
Civiello), 348 B.R. 459, 464 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006). Section 523(a)(19) applies to
corporate executives and even individual brokers. Kelli A. Alces, Moving Toward a
Federal Law of Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 621, 630
(2007). It encompasses statutory securities violations and common-law fraud in
securities transactions. Smith v. Gibbons (In re Gibbons), 289 B.R. 588, 592 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2003). Section 523(a)(19) was enacted to amend the Code to make
nondischargeable judgments and settlements arising from state and federal securities
law violations challenged by state or federal regulators, as well as by private parties. S.
REP. NO. 107-146, at 11 (2002); see also In re Weilein, 319 B.R. 175, 179 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa 2004); In re McClung, 304 B.R. 419, 424 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2004).
287. This principle is well-settled. E.g., Scrivner v. Mashburn (In re Scrivner), 535
F.3d 1258, 1263 (10th Cir. 2008) (“We have repeatedly emphasized . . that a
bankruptcy court may not exercise its broad equitable powers under § 105(a) in a
manner that is inconsistent with the other, more specific provisions of the Code.”)
(internal quotations omitted); In re Nat’l Energy & Gas Transmission, Inc., 492 F.3d
297, 302 n.4 (4th Cir. 2007) (“The Bankruptcy Code, of course, provides parameters
within which courts must exercise their equitable powers in administering an estate.”);
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IV. BANKRUPTCY’S PROBLEMATIC REMEDY FOR SECURITIES FRAUD
Thus far, this Article has shown that bankruptcy can impede
investor recovery for fraud, even outside of the bankruptcy context, from
non-debtors. This Part now turns to the Code’s proposed remedy—the
trustee—and shows why the trustee is not always adequate. First,
trustees encounter problems of standing when pursuing claims for
securities fraud. Even if the trustee circumvents standing by using
securities fraud as a basis for voiding a transaction, rather than
proceeding directly on an action for securities fraud, the trustee cannot
pursue damages.288 Even still, a trustee would likely encounter
considerable trouble recovering insurance proceeds, the principal
funding for securities fraud violations.289
A. STANDING PROBLEMS AND INADEQUATE RESCISSORY REMEDIES
A trustee is an independent person that takes control of the bankrupt
company.290 The trustee employs investigators that work from inside—
demanding discovery without resorting to the court, accessing the
company’s files without restrictions, and requiring disclosure from the
company’s attorneys without the protection of the attorney-client
privilege.291 The Code mandates the appointment of a trustee in cases of
fraud.292

Sherman v. Harbin (In re Harbin), 486 F.3d 510, 521 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he
bankruptcy court may exercise its equitable discretion to develop an appropriate
remedy, provided, of course, that the chosen remedy is consistent with the provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code.”); Vill. of Rosemont v. Jaffe, 482 F.3d 926, 935 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“Instead, the equitable discretion conferred upon the bankruptcy court by section
105(a) is limited and cannot be used in a manner inconsistent with the commands of the
Bankruptcy Code.”); Noonan v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs. (In re Ludlow Hosp.
Soc., Inc.), 124 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 1997) (“The bankruptcy court may not utilize
section 105(a) if another, more particularized Code provision ... impedes the requested
exercise of equitable power.”); Smith v. Omni Mfg., Inc. (In re Smith), 21 F.3d 660,
666 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Bankruptcy courts cannot use their equity power under Section
105(a) ... to negate substantive rights or remedies that are available” under the Code.”).
288. See supra Part IV.A.
289. See supra Part IV.B.
290. LOPUCKI, supra note 65, at 11.
291. LOPUCKI, supra note 65, at 11-12.
292. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (“At any time after the commencement of the case but
before confirmation of a plan, on request of a party in interest or the United States
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Under the Code, the trustee can pursue claims on behalf of the
debtor’s estate, including claims the debtor-company may have against
its officers and directors or other entities for securities fraud.293
However, standing under the securities laws still presents a problem.
Only a purchaser or seller of stock can sue for securities fraud under §
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.294 The trustee is neither a purchaser nor a seller
of securities. Although a trustee can bring suit as the issuer (or seller) of
the stock,295 this recovery inures for the benefit of the corporation and its
trustee, and after notice and a hearing, the court shall order the appointment of a
trustee—(1) for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross
mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor by current management, either before or
after the commencement of the case, or similar cause, but not including the number of
holders of securities of the debtor or the amount of assets or liabilities of the debtor . . .
“). Surprisingly in Enron, the bankruptcy court did not appoint a trustee even though the
Code gave the court discretionary authority to appoint a trustee in Chapter 11
proceedings in cases of fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross management at the
time. LOPUCKI, supra note 65, at 12; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). Section 1104 of
This mandate was Congress’s response to Enron’s bankruptcy in which the bankruptcy
judge delayed a hearing on motions for the appointment of a trustee until a deal was
brokered that left most of Enron’s management in place and “[a]s a result, the
investigators remained on the outside for the duration of the Enron case.” LOPUCKI,
supra note 65, at 14. To remedy the failure to appoint a trustee in Enron, Congress
ordered that the United States Trustee must move for the appointment of a trustee if
there are reasonable grounds to suspect that those currently in control of the business
participated in actual fraud, dishonesty, or criminal conduct as they managed the debtor.
WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 87, at 443. There is a quid pro quo here too
though: while the appointment of a trustee removes those suspected of fraud from the
reins of the corporation, it puts the trustee at the helm, who, no doubt, is less capable of
running the business. Id. at 444.
293. 11 U.S.C. § 323(b).
294. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975).
295. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ““ERISA’’ Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d 742,
797 (S.D. Tex. 2005); Profilet v. Cambridge Fin. Corp., 231 B.R. 373, 378 (S.D. Fla.
1999); Estate of Soler v. Rodriguez, 63 F.3d 45, 54 (1st Cir.1995) (“It is now
well-established that a corporation has a claim under § 10(b) if the corporation was
defrauded in respect to the sale of its own securities by some or even all of its
directors.”); In re Stat-Tech Sec. Litig., 905 F. Supp. 1416, 1423 (D. Colo. 1995)
(holding that corporation emerging from bankruptcy has standing under 10b-5 because
“it is ‘well established’ that § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 protect corporations as well as
persons. Thus a corporation that issues its own stock in reliance on another’s deceptive
or manipulative practice may be deemed a ‘seller’ with standing to sue under § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5.”) (citing Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,
404 U.S. 6 (1971)); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 200-03 (5th
Cir. 1960),.
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creditors. The individual purchasers do not benefit—their claims are
subordinated in bankruptcy.296 The trustee has no standing to assert
claims for damages on behalf of the defrauded purchasers of
securities.297
Standing can be avoided for purchasers of securities, though, if the
trustee uses the violation of the securities laws, not as an action for
securities fraud, but as a basis for setting aside certain transactions.
Specifically, the Code gives a trustee the power to avoid fraudulent
transfers.29 8 If a transaction violates the federal securities laws, it may
be basis for avoiding the transaction.299 In In re Fink, the Chapter 7
debtor’s trustee filed an adversary complaint against a securities
brokerage firm to recover certain payments.300 The debtor, a securities
salesman with a brokerage firm, arranged for bridge financing for
Renaissance Golf Products’ initial public offering.301 The National
Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”), however, objected to the
IPO, finding the compensation for participants, including the brokerage
To accommodate the NASD and keep its
firm, excessive.302
compensation deal intact, the debtor had a third party assign a portion of
the stock it would receive to the debtor for the benefit of the brokerage
firm.303 Renaissance made no mention of this deal in its revised
296. 11 U.S.C. §§ 510(b), 1141(d).
297. E.g., In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 390, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2005);
Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1093 (2d Cir.1995); Bloor v. Carro,
Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 57, 62 n.4 (2d Cir. 1985); In re Fuzion
Tech. Group, Inc., 332 B.R. 225, 237 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005); Wolkowitz v. Soll,
Rowe, Price, Raffel & Browne, Inc. (In re Fink), 217 B.R. 614, 622 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1997).
298. 11 U.S.C. § 548. The Code gives a trustee the power to avoid a variety of
kinds of pre-petition transactions. Such transactions include preferential payments to
creditors (§ 547), fraudulent transfers (§ 548), the fixing of statutory liens (§ 545), and
setoffs (§ 553). In addition, the Code gives a trustee the same avoiding powers that a
creditor has under state law (§ 544(b)).
299. See In re Fink, 217 B.R. at 618.
300. Id. at 617-18.
301. Id. at 617.
302. Id. (“The NASD is authorized . . . to act as a self regulatory organization for
all brokers and dealers of securities that are traded over the counter. [The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 15A, 15 U.S.C. § 78s.] Because the Renaissance securities
were to be traded over the counter, rather than upon a national securities exchange, the
NASD had the authority, subject to the regulation and oversight of the SEC, to ensure
that the IPO was in compliance with NASD and SEC rules.”).
303. In re Fink, 217 B.R. at 617.
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prospectus.304 After the IPO was completed, the third party transferred
the stock to the debtor, and the debtor in turn transferred the stock to the
brokerage firm.305 Ten months later, the debtor filed for Chapter 7
bankruptcy and the trustee sought to void the sale and intercept the
debtor’s payment to the brokerage firm.306 After concluding that the
transfer violated the securities laws, and thus was illegal, the court
avoided the transfer.307 The bankruptcy court emphasized that only a
purchaser or seller of securities could sue for violating § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. Further, here, the trustee’s claim was not brought under these
securities laws, but only premised on them to argue that the transaction
was illegal, and therefore could not impose a valid, legal obligation.308
This provides less than full recovery for plaintiff-investors. The trustee’s
avoidance power is equivalent to rescission or rescissory damages.309
Yet, securities fraud victims can also obtain consequential or actual
damages in addition to rescissory damages.310 The trustee cannot seek
these consequential damages.
B. EXCLUSIONS FROM INSURANCE COVERAGE
The trustee remains an imperfect remedy for securities fraud for an
additional reason: A securities fraud judgment or settlement is usually
funded by insurance.311 Insurance, an untapped source of funding, is
304. Id. at 618.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 623.
308. Id. at 622 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975)).
309. Rescission and rescissory damages are available for claims under both Section
11 and Section 12 of the 1933 Act and under both § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule
10b-5. COFFEE, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 63, at 1117-18. Rescissory
damages measure the difference between the plaintiff’s purchase price and the
plaintiff’s resale price, plus interest, and less any dividends or other corporate
distributions with interest that the plaintiff received. Id. at 1117.
310. Id. at 1130-32; see also Ambassador Hotel Co. v. Wei Chuan Inv., 189 F.3d
1017, 1030 (9th Cir. 1999); Grubb v. Fed. Deposit Ins., Corp., 868 F.2d 1151, 1165
(10th Cir. 1989); Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg., Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 803 (2d Cir. 1973);
James v. Meinke, 778 F.2d 200, 205-06 (5th Cir. 1985).
311. Baker & Griffith, supra note 126, at 761 (“[T]he vast majority of securities
claims settle within or just above the limits of the defendant corporation’s D&O
coverage.”). But see, Bernard Black, et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 1055, 1057 (2006) (in both Enron and Worldcom—both mega-frauds and mega-
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even more important as the company is in bankruptcy and its managers’
personal wealth is often tied to the performance of the company.312
However, a trustee, suing on behalf of the company, may be prohibited
from recovering under these insurance policies because of the “insured
vs. insured” exclusion, which provides that the insurer shall not be liable
to pay for loss in connection with a claim made against an insured that is
brought by any insured or by the company.313 This exclusion protects
the insurer from collusive suits between insureds, i.e., the company and
its officers and directors.314 This is a real concern as insurance fraud is
the second most common white collar crime in the United States (the
first is tax evasion).315 Some securities litigation scholars have found
evidence that plaintiffs and defendants collude to pressure the insurer to
settle on terms that may not reflect the merits of the claim.316
bankruptcies—the companies’ directors personally paid millions as part of settlement).
312. Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The Status of Defrauded Securityholders in Corporate
Bankruptcy, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1, 45 (1983). Coverage under a D&O policy includes a
claim brought by the corporation against one of its officers. Lee R. Russ & Thomas F.
Segalla, Directors and Officers: Application to Actions Involving Corporation, or Other
Officers and Directors, in 9A COUCH ON INSURANCE, § 131:32 (2009).
313. GUMMOW, supra note 128 at 142; Susan N.K. Gummow & David P. Bart,
Director and Officer Liability Insurance: How Bankruptcy Transforms the Rights of the
Various Parties, 14 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 101, 113 (2005). Traditionally, the “insured
vs. insured” exclusion was employed to deny coverage for actions by a director, officer,
or the named company against other directors or officers. Coverage is not limited to
third-party claims; it includes a claim brought by the corporation against one of its
officers. Russ & Segalla, supra note 128. Some policies contain an exception to the
“insured vs. insured” exclusion for persons appointed by a bankruptcy court to act on
behalf of the bankrupt insured. See Kelley v. Fed. Ins. Co. (In re HA 2003, Inc.), 310
B.R. 710, 716-17 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004).
314. In re Buckeye Countrymark, Inc., 251 B.R. 835, 840-41 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
2000).
315. Diane L. Polscer & Brett W. Sommermeyer, Fraud, Concealment, and
Misrepresentation, in LAW & PRACTICE OF INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION § 2:15
(2009).
316. Baker & Griffith, supra note 126, at 756; John C. Coffee Jr., Reforming The
Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and its Implementation, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 1534, 1585 (“To the extent that contemporary securities litigation imposes its
costs almost exclusively on the corporation and its insurers, this system benefits three
sets of actors corporate insiders, plaintiffs’ attorneys, and insurance companies—but
not shareholders. Viewed in this way, the plaintiff’s attorney is less a champion of
shareholders and more a participant in a process by which the parties shift liabilities
created by corporate managers onto shareholders through the medium of costly
insurance paid for by shareholders. Because the repeat players managers, attorneys,
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Thus, whether claims asserted by a trustee against the debtorcompany’s directors and officers are excluded from coverage under the
“insured vs. insured” exclusion is a recurring question. Although a
trustee is treated the same as any other plaintiff with no greater or lesser
rights to insurance proceeds,317 the “insured vs. insured” question arises
because the trustee stands in the shoes of the insured, the company
itself.318 Some courts have recognized this tension and have held that
the “insured vs. insured” exclusion does not apply because a claim by
the trustee is made on behalf of the creditors, and not the debtor.319 In
this case, the trustee is adverse to the directors and officers.320 A
trustee’s ability to recover insurance proceeds for securities fraud is
nevertheless premised on a trustee’s ability to sue for fraud to begin
with, and, as the preceding section showed, the trustee lacks standing on
behalf of plaintiff-investors.

V. CONCLUSION
The aftermath of the financial crisis will focus attention on the
judiciary as it addresses the overlapping bankruptcies and allegations of
securities fraud. This Article illustrates that bankruptcy can provide
significant protection from securities fraud litigation.
However,
investors—the victims of fraud—are further victimized when the
company’s fraud forces it to file bankruptcy and they are denied
recovery against those that do not file for bankruptcy. The securities
laws provide for expansive liability to deter fraud on the market and
promote recovery from liable parties. A company’s bankruptcy though,
for reasons unsupported by the Code or the securities laws, deters
investors from even adjudicating the liability of non-debtors (those that
never consent to the quid pro quo of bankruptcy). In the coming wave
of regulatory reform, Congress must consider this overlap and set the

and insurers all benefit from this system, it remains stable, and the outcome is usually
the same: settlement. . . Often, the result is litigation that is, to a degree, feigned.”).
317. In re Jones, 179 B.R. 450, 455 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995).
318. LaCroix, supra note 9, at 4.
319. GUMMOW, supra note 128, at 143; see also Alstrin v. St. Paul Mercury Ins.
Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 376, 404 (D. Del. 2002); Rigby v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s
London, 907 So.2d 1187, 1189 (Fla. App. Ct. 2005) (applying Florida law); In
re County Seat Stores, Inc., 280 B.R. 319, 326 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).
320. GUMMOW, supra note 128, at 143.
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course to promote investor recovery.
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